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Abstract 
This essay models profit and price effects of horizontal mergers among equally capacity-constrained 
firms, in a homogenous product market à la Bertrand. We demonstrate that horizontal mergers that 
create a larger market rival are always non-harming, in contrast to the provisions of homogenous 
good symmetric Cournot models. The basic symmetric three-firm model and the general oligopoly 
one show that post-merger size configurations that allow for mixed strategy equilibria are always 
profitable for all firms, i.e. there is no free-rider problem by the outsiders. If mixed strategy equilibria 
arise post-merger then price increases since firms randomize their strategy over a higher price range 
(price range extrema are strictly greater than those prior to the merger). Moreover, mergers relax 
competitive constraints since aftermath firms compete less fiercely (post-merger distributions are 
stochastically dominated by the pre-merger ones).  
1. Introduction 
In the long history of theoretical economic literature the characteristics of market structure have been 
a constant concern for economists. The analysis of competition in noncompetitive settings have given 
rise to a number of alternative theories, formalized game theoretically, to constitute the various 
modern theories of oligopoly behavior.
1
 The main body of modern industrial economics research 
informs a set of different games that do not represent competing theories, but rather models relevant 
in different industries or circumstances. The investigation of noncooperative output, pricing, and 
investment policies inevitably intertwines several neighboring topics such as collusion and cartels, 
entry deterrence, and product differentiation. Thus, oligopoly theory informs how an industrial 
economist views and interprets reality and the conclusions of any theoretical work in applied 
microeconomics.
2
 The fundamental strategy choice affects the conclusions not only of the theoretical 
strategic interaction models, but its applications to more specific settings. 
As a clear example of the diversity of the conclusions that can be reached studying the same 
phenomenon under the light of different oligopolistic settings, merger activity has received great 
interest in the theoretical industrial economics research. Yet, despite the conspicuous literature on the 
subject, no unanimous consent has been achieved on the unilateral effects of horizontal combinations 
of firms in closely related markets. In oligopoly models à la Cournot, Salant Switzer and Reynolds 
                                                          
1 Sir Thomas Moore coined the term oligopoly in his “Utopia” (1517) sensing small number rivalry may not necessarily 
lead to a fall in price to the competitive level. The reference to Moore relies on Schumpeter (1954, p. 305). 
2 For standard textbook reference on oligopoly theory and horizontal mergers, see Tirole (1988) and Vives (2001). For a 
survey on horizontal mergers and collusion, see Jacquemin and Slade (1989). 
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(1983) find that horizontal mergers without cost synergies are not beneficial to merging firms unless 
they involve the vast majority of market participants. On the contrary, nonmerged firms gain from 
the merger, free riding the price increase by the merged firm. Perry and Porter (1985), 
 
Farrell and 
Shapiro (1990), Levin (1990), and McAfee and Williams (1992) propose different approaches for the 
resolution of the paradoxical result within models of quantity competition. The approach in Daughety 
(1990) assumes that the merger changes the rules of the game. The model analyzes competition à la 
Stackelberg with multiple followers and leaders in which a merger between two followers allows the 
new firm to become a leader. 
In oligopolies à la Bertrand with product differentiation, Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Braid 
(1986), Reitzes and Levy (1990), and Levy and Reitzes (1992) attain profitability of horizontal 
mergers for insiders, although confirming the higher gains for outsiders and the overall industry-wide 
price increase.
3
 On these grounds, horizontal merging would hardly be explainable since a firm 
always prefers to remain an outsider.
4
 In computational models à la Bertrand-Edgeworth, Froeb, 
Tschantz and Crooke (2003), Higgins, Johnson and Sullivan (2004), and Choné and Linnemer (2010) 
find that horizontal mergers have no real effect on price, quantity, consumer surplus and total 
welfare. Froeb et al. (2003) investigate a merger model with capacity-constrained price setters 
engaging in the parking lots business. The model shows price increase for the non-merged firms, as 
expected, but not for the merged firms whose capacity constraints are in fact binding and their price 
does not levitate. They show this latter effect prevails on the former and the merger depresses price. 
Thus, the net merger effect on price, consumer surplus, and total welfare is null. 
Our essay models horizontal mergers, i.e. mergers among close competitors, in noncooperative static 
pricing games among a fixed number of active capacity-constrained oligopolists.
5
 The aim of this 
dissertation is to characterize theoretically and investigate thoroughly price and profit effects of 
horizontal mergers, in a static framework of equally-sized suppliers of a homogenous good with 
Bertrand competition.
6
 Choosing price as strategy rather than quantity produces several appealing 
                                                          
3 Empirical evidence on the impact of horizontal mergers on outsiders upholds the idea that outsiders are harmed by 
horizontal combinations of rivals, see Eckbo (1983), Stillman (1983), and Banerjee and Eckard (1998). 
4 Kamien and Zang (1990) notice that encouraging mergers, short of participation, makes it hard to prevent defections from 
a proposed merger, even if it is beneficial. 
5 Static oligopoly theory provides predictions about short-run firms’ behavior, taking as given the the set of firms competing 
in the market. Long-run industry analysis can be enriched by entry and exit considerations as in Werden and Froeb (1998), 
Cabral (2003), Spector (2003), and Davidson and Mukherjee (2007).  
6 Whereas the horizontal mergers literature focuses on Cournot competition or differentiated product Bertrand competition, 
very little theoretical advance has been made in the theoretical investigation of horizontal mergers in homogenous product 
Bertrand competition. The exceptions are the work of Hirata (2009) in the context of asymmetric triopoly and more recently 
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results in horizontal merger analysis with capacity constraints. Horizontal mergers,
 
even in absence 
of cost synergies, ought to be profitable since they increase market power for the merged firm. The 
symmetric premerger competitors merge to create a bigger firm whose size ought to gain an 
advantage to the merged firm with respect to outsiders. The results of this work hinge on the 
dimensional assumptions on firms’ size to determine the nature of equilibrium. As in Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983), if capacities are unlimited, equilibrium will be à la Bertrand, i.e. marginal cost 
pricing, independent of the number of firms or the elasticity of aggregate demand. If capacities are 
set small enough, i.e. not greater than its best response quantity when the rivals supply their full 
capacity, each firm simply sets the price that markets all production. For intermediate levels of 
capacity, equilibrium has to be characterized in mixed strategies. 
Horizontal mergers affect equilibrium characteristics by modifying the capacity configuration of the 
market post-merger. Different dimensional characteristics of the merged firm with respect to the 
remainder of the industry might alter firms’ price incentives. If individual firms’ capacity is so large 
to satisfy all forthcoming demand at marginal cost either individually or collectively then horizontal 
mergers do not affect equilibrium price and profits. Capacity is so large that even pre-merger it drives 
price down to marginal cost. Analogously, if firms’ capacity is so low (firms are in fact capacity-
constrained), that is if firms charge the price that markets aggregate production, then equilibrium 
post-merger is unaltered by the merger and no effect is exerted by the merger itself. This means that 
if post-merger firms’ capacity is so big or so small to allow for a pure strategy equilibrium with the 
same characteristics as those prior to the merger, then horizontal mergers do not have effects on both 
price and profits (both industry-wide and individually with no distinction between merged and non-
merged firms). 
However, if the merged firm gains sizable dimensional advantage, post-merger equilibrium in mixed 
strategies emerges and post-merger firms will randomize their price offers over a range that is strictly 
higher than the pure strategy equilibrium premerger.
7
 Hence, horizontal mergers alter market 
structure and are always profitable for both merged and non-merged firms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
the work of Gang Li (2013). The latter work refers to the first essay of the Ph.D. dissertation of the scholar whose work 
parallels ours in many regards. The study of the symmetric triopoly and oligopoly in Gang Li is shorten of the original 
Bertrand position, focusing on the pure strategy region where equilibrium is à la Cournot and the mixed strategy one. The 
extension to the symmetric oligopoly case considers only the merger of two firms among the   participants, in the same 
equilibrium regions observed in the triopolistic industry. Our model instead considers the full span of capacities, for both 
the triopoly and the oligopoly, and extends the number of merger partners from two to  , for a more general horizontal 
mergers analysis in symmetric oligopolies. 
7 Mixed strategy equilibria model the volatility of price offers among suppliers of a homogenous good. The relevance of the 
analysis of mixed strategy equilibrium in this essay may be paralleled to the investigation of price competition in price 
dispersion models à la Varian (1980). These models’ findings, allowing for mixed strategy equilibria, do not match the 
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Mixed strategies equilibria are characterized by higher price than pre-merger and higher single-firm 
as well as industry profits. Pre-merger mixed strategy equilibria never revert to a pure strategy 
equilibrium. If capacities fall in the mixed strategies region then firms mix their strategies post-
merger on a higher than premerger price range. Not only mergers induce a price increase in this 
framework, but post-merger price distributions stochastically dominate pre-merger ones as well. 
Horizontal mergers increase market concentration and so doing internalize the negative externality 
that more aggressive pricing have on rival suppliers. Then, horizontal combinations of firms in a 
static price-setting game create a price-increasing effect (that translates into an actual price increase) 
and allow firms to undercut a certain price level with lower probability than pre-merger. 
This essay is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the most preeminent literature of horizontal 
mergers introducing the theoretical analysis of the “merger paradox” and the strand of literature both 
in Cournot and Bertrand competition that followed. Chapter 3 gives the interpretative tools for the 
analysis of the following chapters, illustrating the literature on price-setting oligopolies and their 
results. Chapter 4 studies the basic symmetric triopoly, whose equilibrium characteristics pre and 
post-merger is characterized completely to address price and profit effects of horizontal mergers of 
any two firms in the industry. Chapter 5 extends the reach of the previous chapter, investigating 
horizontal merger effects in a symmetric oligopoly and a linear demand function example. Chapter 6 
concludes. 
2. The Trouble with Horizontal Mergers 
Mergers represent the ultimate form of collusion: when two firms merge, they combine their assets in 
a new entity, whose constituent firms lose their independent identities. The simplest class of models 
in which is possible to characterize, analytically and formally, the consequences of takeovers among 
sellers are static oligopoly models. Most frequently mergers can be modeled as an exogenous change 
in market structure.
8
  According to the game theoretic approach, mergers correspond to a move from 
a Nash equilibrium in a given coalition structure to a coarser one. Theoretical approaches do not 
easily encompass welfare considerations, except in a very partial-equilibrium setting. Due to these 
difficulties, the positive side of the analysis has received more weight than the normative.
 
The subject 
of mergers is particularly broad, involving different definitions for different phenomena. Although all 
are worthy of scrupulous analysis, we limit ourselves to horizontal mergers, i.e. mergers among firms 
with substantial overlap of business. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
provisions of the Law of One Price, and sustain the multiplicity of price levels through time in a market with 
heterogeneously informed consumers and homogenous product. 
8 There is a fairly large literature that tries to endogenize the set of mergers occurring in a market absent any antitrust 
constraint. See Kamien and Zang (1990), Bloch (1996), Yi (1997), and Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004). 
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The raise of economists' and competition agencies’ concern with horizontal combinations has its 
roots in the relationship between industry concentration and pricing policy.
9
 A more concentrated 
market is presumed to give way of unilateral price increases by the competing firms. Fixing rival 
prices or outputs, a merger among sellers of substitute goods will lead to internalize the negative 
externality that more aggressive pricing or output choices have on the merger partners. Further 
“regularity” conditions are needed for a merger to effectively translate the price-increasing effect in a 
factual price increase. Absent efficiency gains, a merger raises price under fairly weak regularity 
conditions in the homogenous product Cournot model. 
In differentiated price competition models, for a merger to rise industry-wide price it is necessary that 
the diversion ratio (the recipient of the lost share of individual firms’ sales, due to a product’s price 
increase, is the merged firm) creates an incentive for the merged entity to increase the price of any 
one of its products holding fixed the prices of all of its other products and the prices of rivals. Thus, 
holding rival prices fixed at any levels, it is sufficient to show that the merger causes the merged firm 
to raise all of its prices to ensure a price increase.  This implies that the best responses are “upward 
sloping”. The latter condition implies that the merged firm’s price increases lead rivals to increase 
their prices, which in turn causes the merged firm to further increase its own prices, and so on. Price 
distortion is not the only presumed effect of a decrease in market concentration. Fewer competitors 
are presumed to collude more easily, fixing output shares and prices more successfully than in larger 
and more competitive industries. 
This chapter surveys the most important and established results in horizontal merger analysis, both 
theoretical and empirical, to investigate the emergence of the “merger paradox” and the most relevant 
studies that followed. Section 2.1 introduces the unilateral effects approach, i.e. the investigation of 
unilateral post merger price increases. In subsection 2.1.1 the Salant et al. (1983) “merger paradox” is 
presented, as well as alternative models to overcome such result. Models that encompass welfare 
considerations in quantity-setting oligopolies are considered in subsection 2.1.2. Section 2.2 presents 
the “coordinated effects” approach, i.e. investigation of mergers on collusive behavior. The 
concluding third 2.3 and 2.4 are devoted to a review of the empirics of horizontal mergers and the 
theory of merger waves. 
2.1. The Economics of Horizontal Mergers: The Unilateral Effects Approach 
Increased concentration through mergers among direct competitors arises concern since they may 
lead to anticompetitive price increases; either because the merged entity unilaterally raises prices 
                                                          
9 For the economics of antitrust and regulation that encompass welfare evaluations, see Motta (2004), Whinston (2006), and 
Buccirossi (2008). For a survey on the economic principles of antitrust, see Kaplow and Shapiro (2007). 
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from pre-merger levels (so-called unilateral effects) or because the increase in concentration 
enhances the prospects for successful collusion (coordinated effects).
10
 Nevertheless, it is not at all 
clear that the acquiring firm benefits from its efforts. This problem was recognized long ago by 
Stigler (1950) who noted that the promoter of a merger might expect to receive every form of 
encouragement from other firms, short of participation. The underlying idea of theories of unilateral 
effects is that the merged firm will have an incentive to raise its price post-merger, because of the 
elimination of direct competition among the firms that have merged. The idea that a firm with a large 
share will have more market power, thus charging a higher price still lower than the monopoly price, 
has been very influential in horizontal merger enforcement. So has the idea that margins are higher in 
more concentrated industries. The examination of specific oligopoly models makes it possible to 
quantify horizontal mergers effects in order to identify the mergers that are most likely to have 
significant price effects and thus cause significant harm to consumers. Moreover, quantification 
allows estimating the merger efficiencies necessary to offset the loss of competition and thereby be 
cleared by competition authorities according to the consumer surplus or total welfare standards. 
2.1.1. Cournot Competition and the “Merger Paradox” 
Although awaited, mergers need not be profitable for the insider firms. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 
(1983), notice that horizontal mergers
11
 in homogeneous product Cournot-Nash industry might be 
unprofitable. That is, mergers can increase industry profit and, at the same time, reduce profitability 
of the merged firms below the sum of individual firms’ premerger profits. The reduction in the 
number of firms, that implies an output restriction, raises price. The merging firms reduce their 
output because they internalize more of the effect of their output on price than they did previously. In 
turn, non-merging firms raise output somewhat, leading the merging firms to cut output further. At 
the new equilibrium, price is higher. But the merged firm’s combined share of total industry profits is 
lower; after all, outsider firms’ quantities rise and the output of the merging firms falls. Salant et al. 
(1983) consider the case of symmetric oligopolists facing linear decreasing demand        and 
constant marginal costs. Under these assumptions, industry equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. each firm 
produces the same output and earns the same profit. More formally, suppose that there are initially   
firms and that each faces price     
   
      
 , sells quantity      
   
       
 , and earns profits 
                                                          
10 A price increase is often a proxy for other forms of anticompetitive effects, e.g. a reduction in product quality and service 
11 Following Stigler’s (1966) definition a horizontal merger is defined as a binding agreement to maximize profits jointly by 
correlating their strategies and making side payments, if necessary. The merged firm is then treated as a multiplant Cournot 
player engaged in a noncooperative game against the remainder of the industry. 
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. When  firms merge, for   , it will be the case that, choosing         to 
maximize profits 
       ∑                  ∑           
 
        
 
        (2.1) 
Where    is the total output of the post merger firm. Substituting in the equation of the inverse 
demand curve 
      *(
   
 
)                    +      (2.2) 
The post merger firm reaction (best-response) function is 
                          ⁄        (2.3) 
This is the best response of a single firm in an      -firm Cournot oligopoly. The best response 
functions of the independent firms are unchanged by the merger, leaving the post merger equilibrium 
as it would be in the case of a Cournot game with       equally sized firms.12  These are 
standard conditions stating that the profit of each firm, as well as total industry profit, increases as the 
number of firms is reduced. Under these specific conditions on demand and cost functions, the 
merger is profitable if and only if 
 
  
(
   
       
)
 
 
 
 
(
   
   
)
 
.Or otherwise 
                            (2.4) 
Inequality (1.4) states that the profit to the single merged firm can be less than the sum of the pre-
merger profits of its constituent firms. This occurs depending on the values of m and n. Simplifying 
inequality (1.4) leads to 
     [                  ]         (2.5) 
Since a merger will occur among more than two firms, the first term will be negative and the relevant 
inequality turns out to be 
                            (2.6) 
Whose solution is 
     √    
 
   
     √    
 
        (2.7) 
                                                          
12 The symmetric treatment stems from the assumption of constant, identical marginal and average cost. The increase in 
industrial concentration increases outsiders’ profits while the coalition has to divide these profits  ways, increasing the 
possibility of horizontal mergers to be unprofitable. 
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Since, necessarily   , then 
     √    
 
                          (2.8) 
Let’s consider the case is of an almost market-monopolizing merger involving     firms, and solve 
the inequality for such a case. Then inequality becomes 
     √    
 
       √                      (2.9) 
                               (2.10) 
this partial result may be generalized considering a generic number of firms   
     √    
 
          √                     (2.11) 
                                         (2.12) 
The condition associated to horizontal merger profitability is quite restrictive, imposing a high 
number of participants for the merger to be profitable. For instance, a merger to duopoly in a three-
firm market will not be profitable in such a setting. The argument may be repeated and extended 
leading to the fact that for a merger to be profitable the 80% of market participants need to take part 
in the merger. The exception to such a finding occurs when oligopolists merge into monopoly. 
In this simple model, a merger does not lead to a bigger and fiercer competitor in the market in any 
sense. Furthermore, not only the merger may be at least non profitable for the constituent firms, but it 
is ultimately profitable for the outsiders.
13
 Note that this model is not a dominant-firm and 
competitive-fringe model: firms  are not price takers. In the new symmetric equilibrium, each firm 
shares the output restriction equally. The peculiar result obtains because there is nothing to 
distinguish the merged firm from the   –  non merged firms: all have access to the same technology 
and therefore, all firms produce     –      ⁄  of the industry output. However, this model violates 
the intuitive notion of what horizontal mergers are all about. Starting with   identical firms of which 
  merge, we expect the result to be   –  small old firms and one large new firm, that is to say the 
merged firm would be expected to gain in capacity rather than scaling-down its constituents’ 
capacity. The new firm should have access to the combined productive capacity of the merger 
partners. Moreover, the model doesn’t consider capacity constraints, i.e. assumes constant returns to 
scale, as well as does not assume cost differences among firms and product differentiation. 
                                                          
13 Here the merger can be seen to have produced a public good, i.e. the high price level, that the non-merging firms free-
ride, earning higher profits than pre merger by selling the same output at higher price. 
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Accordingly, a theory that plausibly explains mergers that actually occur requires that the merging 
firms own assets that can be usefully combined. In two different works, i.e. different competitive 
frameworks, both Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and Perry and Porter (1985), reverse the Salant et 
al. results and find that an incentive to merge would rise by introducing different notions of size. 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) consider the case of price-setting firms producing symmetrically 
differentiated products.
14
 In their model, when firms merge the merged firm can continue to 
manufacture the entire product line of each constituent firm. That is to say, the merged firm can 
always duplicate the actions by its members before they joined, without altering the characteristics of 
their products. Firms own exclusive technology for production, i.e. patents, and operate at constant 
and identical average cost. Under these assumptions, the Salant et al. results can be reversed thanks 
to a particular feature of the price setting game: best responses are upward sloping. This implies that 
an initial price increase of the coalition will be followed by an increase on the part of outsiders. 
Coalition then raises price and so on. It must be reminded that the game is a static game, not to be 
confused with multi-stage repeated games.  Settlement will lead to higher price level and all firms 
will be better off. Hence, under fairly reasonable demand schedule, mergers become always 
beneficial to existing members and become more and more profitable as the size of the aggregation 
increases. 
Perry and Porter (1985) choose a different route to address the merger paradox, analyzing the cost 
side. In their model, each firm produces a homogeneous product and owns some fraction of a 
tangible asset of the capital factor, whose industry fixed supply is normalized to one.
 15
 So they can 
address the asymmetries caused by the merger of subsets of firms. When firms merge, the newly 
created firm controls the assets belonging to each of its constituents and faces a new maximization 
problem because of its altered cost structure and strategic considerations. It is assumed that the long-
run technology is subject to constant returns but that, due to the presence of the fixed factor, any 
single firm's short-run marginal-cost curve is upward sloping. A large firm, holding a higher fixed 
factor share, can therefore produce the same output at lower cost than a smaller firm. Two cases are 
considered, a dominant-firm and competitive-fringe model and an oligopoly with large and small 
firms. The results from the first model are very similar to those obtained in d'Aspremont, Jacquemin, 
Jaskold-Gabszewicz and Weymark (1983). Perry and Porter, for instance, find that there is always an 
incentive for a dominant firm to form out of the fringe. Whether or not additional firms merge 
depends on the precise demand and cost parameters. In general, however, there will be an 
                                                          
14 On the Bertrand differentiated products literature, see Ivaldi et al. (2003), Motta (2004, pp. 243–265), and Werden and 
Froeb (2008). 
15 This suppresses de novo entry into the industry. The fixed-factor assumption is a limiting case of upward sloping factor 
supply curve. By fixing the size of the industry it is easy to examine changes in the number of firms and their sizes. 
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equilibrium number of merged firms, i.e. a stable cartel successfully forms. The second model, with 
asymmetries in dimensions of firms, is a closer analogy to the Salant et al. setting. With increasing 
marginal costs, however, the incentive to merge usually remains. The incentive to merge depends 
upon the resolution of two forces. First, a merger results in a price raise, benefiting all firms, and 
second, the output reduction of the merged entity declines relative to that of its partners prior to the 
merger. The price increase benefits all firms and can be often sufficient to compensate for the output 
reduction of the merged firm, so to increase profits. Although a merger incentive need not necessarily 
follow, the output decrease is less severe than the Salant et al. result. As a matter of fact, Salant et al. 
ought to be considered essentially the limiting case of the more general Perry and Porter model, 
obtained as the marginal-cost curve flattens. 
2.1.2. Horizontal Mergers Are Worth a Defense: Static Efficiencies 
Antitrust authorities work, amongst the other interests and objectives, to prevent monopolization of 
the market and render oligopolistic coordination more difficult. Although a standalone reason for 
mergers to be scrutinized severely, horizontal concentration, via merger, is not only inspired by 
twisting the terms of trade to gain higher profits, but a few motives may be adduced. Our brief 
treatment is devoted to the recognition of specific areas of inspection that are considered at length in 
devoted surveys and articles.
 
We will mention the static economies of scale, scope and product 
variety and the dynamic ones of learning and technical change, as the most effectively studied and 
illustrated. 
Economies of scale have long been proposed as an antitrust defense, inspired by Williamson’s (1968) 
seminal contribution.
16
 Economies of scale are said to exist whenever long-run average cost declines 
with output, because of set-up costs or marginal cost decline as production expands. When 
economies occur, there is a tradeoff between cost reduction and output restriction as the number of 
firms varies. The net effect would depend on several factors, e.g. own and cross-price elasticities of 
demand, own and cross-output elasticities of total cost, degree of collusion in the market, and 
whether the nature of collusion changes with the number of firms. Upon sufficient assumptions about 
demand, cost, and collusion, can be obtained partial-equilibrium formulas for the sizes of cost 
savings and surplus reductions. This is not our intention here.
 
Rather, we simply wish to emphasize 
that, when scale (and scope) economies exist, under fairly comprehensive assumptions, few firms 
may be preferred to many and market structure would depart from perfect competition. 
                                                          
16 Static efficiencies comprise economies of scope, as well. Economies of scope arise when joint production of two or more 
products is cheaper than the cost of producing the products separately. For the formal analysis of economies of scope, see 
Panzar and Willig (1981) and Waterson (1983). 
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Whether or not mergers are beneficial under these circumstances, however, is a very different issue. 
Mergers occur between existing firms whose cost structures are not completely flexible, when two of 
them merge, it is not clear if cost reductions can be realized ex post. Welfare effects evaluation in a 
static context belong to this stream of economic analysis of oligopolistic competition. The so called 
“efficiency defense” has been emphasized by Williamson (1968), in a simple partial equilibrium 
model of pre merger competitive equilibrium. The need to reconcile reduction of competition and 
productivity gains by merger, led Williamson to the result of small cost reductions may more than 
compensate twisting terms of trade, i.e. price increase, enhancing total welfare. In Whinston (2007, p. 
2347) the formal argument is presented as follows: welfare reduction due to an infinitesimal increase 
in price from the competitive price is of second-order, i.e. has a zero derivative, while the welfare 
increase from an infinitesimal decrease in cost is of first-order, i.e. has a strictly positive derivative. 
The model is not free of doubtful assumptions and is worthy of careful scrutiny. The starting 
assumption of competitive economy, i.e. price equals marginal cost, is quite strong. Then Williamson 
glosses over different cost structures among firms, considering a unique marginal cost prevailing in 
the oligopolistic market, which often show empirical differences among firms’ marginal cost levels, 
both before and after the merger. Since cost gains are likely to occur to merged firms, unless we 
consider industry-wide aggregations, this assumption may show itself critical for welfare evaluation. 
Moreover, Williamson object is aggregate surplus maximization, while antitrust policy raises 
questions of distribution.  Many enforcement agencies focus on consumer surplus standard and not 
on aggregate one to evaluate mergers. Last, but not least, Williamson considers price as the only 
competitive variable. In practice, firms compete over capacity, investment, R&D, product quality 
depending on the market structure a merger might affect. 
The argument has been then developed and deepened by Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
 17
 In their model 
à la Cournot under quite general demand and cost stability assumptions sufficient conditions for 
profitable mergers to raise total welfare are provided. Mergers are shown to raise price unless cost 
synergies are generated among merging firms, i.e. considerable economies of scale or learning. For 
price to fall, the merged firm’s marginal cost at the pre-merger joint output of merging firms, must be 
below the marginal cost of the more efficient merger partner. If the merged firm had the same 
marginal cost as the most efficient merger partner, then a marginal increase in output would have the 
same incremental cost and would be sold at the same price for the two firms. Perhaps price reduction 
would be more costly for the merged firm than for the more efficient merger partner, since merged 
firm sells more.  Considering the price incentives of the firms, as the more efficient merger partner 
did not find it worthwhile to further increase its output before the merger, so it will the merged firm. 
                                                          
17 For related analyses, see Levin (1990) and McAfee and Williams (1992). 
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Hence, for the merged firm to increase its output above the pre-merger level, and consequently 
reduce price, it must have a lower marginal cost than the more efficient merger partner. 
Let a horizontal merger in Cournot industry be formalized as the replacement of two pre-existing 
firms (whose respective cost functions are        and       ) with a new firm whose cost function 
is         . Farrell and Shapiro define the merger to raise no synergies if the merger simply allows 
the merging firms to rationalize output between their existing operations or facilities. The merged 
firm solves the problem          min    [             ] subject to          . Define 
the two merging firms’ pre-merger outputs as      ̅̅ ̅ and      ̅̅ ̅, with   ̅̅ ̅    ̅̅ ̅, and the pre-
merger price as    ̅. Pre-merger Cournot equilibrium condition obtained by firms’ optimization 
problem is  
 ̅    
 ̅
 
  
|  |
, where is the     firm   marginal cost,        ⁄ defines firm   market 
share, and    market elasticity of demand. Larger firms have higher markups (the LHS of 
equilibrium condition), so firm 1’s marginal cost in the pre-merger equilibrium,   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        ̅̅ ̅ , at 
least evens firm 2’s,   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        ̅̅ ̅ . Let the merged firm’s marginal cost at the combined pre-
merger output be     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅         ̅̅ ̅    ̅̅ ̅ . Without synergies, the merged firm’s ability to 
rationalize production between its existing operations (by equating the marginal cost of production in 
the two operations) is not sufficient to offset the incentive to raise price that results from combining 
the ownership interests of the two operations. For a horizontal merger to lead to a reduction rather 
than an increase in price it is necessary to realize synergies that Farrell and Shapiro quantify in a very 
general necessary and sufficient condition: a merger reduces price if and only if 
          ̅     .                               (2.13) 
Since       ̅̅ ̅        ̅̅ ̅   ̅ , that follows from the firms’ optimization problem first-order 
conditions and the fact that   ̅̅ ̅    ̅̅ ̅   . That is, the merger will reduce price if and only if the 
merged firm marginal cost (at the pre-merger combined output) is lower than the marginal cost of the 
more efficient firm (at its own pre-merger output) to a greater extent than the difference between pre-
merger price and the marginal cost of the smaller, less efficient firm (at its own pre-merger output). 
This inequality can be expressed in proportion to the pre-merger price as          ̅⁄  
 ̅      ̅⁄    |  |⁄ . This expresses the pre-merger relationship between firm 1’s margin (or 
market power) and its share. In industries with moderate to large pre-merger margins the condition 
becomes very strict to be satisfied. Using these general results, Froeb and Werden (1998) provide 
calculations that relate the required magnitude of the synergies to the pre-merger shares of the 
merging firms. In the symmetric case, they show that the proportionate reduction in marginal cost 
necessary for price not to rise is equal to   |  |    ⁄ ,where S is the pre-merger market share of 
each merging firm. 
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The study of welfare effects, presuming that proposed mergers are profitable for the parties and, 
implicitly, that private gains for merging parties translate into social gains, is more complex and 
depends upon the cost structures of both the merged firm and the merging partners. Since welfare 
measures require a great deal of information to be assessed, Farrell and Shapiro introduce differential 
techniques to study the external effects on consumers and outsider firms. If the externality is positive, 
so it will be aggregate surplus variation. To overcome the difficulty in directly signing the 
mathematical effect, the model considers a small change in joint profits, which is called 
“infinitesimal mergers”.  Farrell and Shapiro show that in this case the external effect is non-negative 
if the market share of the merging firms is less than an elasticity-adjusted Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index of the non-merging firms.
18
 They also find that mergers increasing output are welfare 
enhancing, as well as those that increase the Herfindahl index.  Absent synergies, a merger rises price 
because merged firm joint output falls, since total output will move in the same direction as merged 
firm’s output. They consider examples of policy implications within this framework, as well. The 
first considers moderate size mergers, under reasonably general conditions, that rise price and are 
privately profitable, increase welfare. The second considers an open economy, and obtains under 
suitably general conditions, that imposing or tightening an import quota when the import share is 
low, increases welfare. 
2.1.3. Horizontal Mergers Are Worth a Defense: Dynamic Efficiencies 
As most analyses focus on static models of oligopolistic interaction, a stream or research has opposed 
to the one shot static economies, the dynamic ones. These occur over time and, as it is the case of 
intertemporal problems, the issues are even more complex.  Dynamic effects are learning and 
technical change. Learning is said to occur when unit cost declines with cumulative output. In 
assessing competition policy, it is important whether learning occurs within an industry or within a 
firm. When the benefits of learning cannot be captured by firms, there is no incentive to have fewer 
firms in an industry. The standard economic analysis assumes learning as firm specific, see Spence 
(1981) and Tirole and Fudenberg (1983). The special dynamic issues that arise as a consequence of 
learning, such as the possibility of strategic behavior, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Under the 
lens of competition policy, learning bears a resemblance to scale economies. The calculation of the 
sizes of these effects is even more complex than with static economies but the same qualitative 
conclusions hold. 
                                                          
18 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration, commonly used in antitrust analysis, especially of 
horizontal mergers is defined as   ∑   
 
 . The industry-wide average, output-weighted, price-cost margin gives the 
definition of the elasticity-adjusted Herfindahl–Hirschman index:     ∑   
 ̅    
 ̅
 
    ∑   
 |  |⁄ . 
17 
 
Technical change, which expands the production possibilities available to society, is perhaps the 
most important dynamic economy. Few economists would disagree with the claim that the dynamic-
efficiency gains from continuing innovation far outweigh the static gains from marginal-cost pricing.  
If markets where innovation is frequent, might be characterize by less vigilant competition policy, 
monopoly rents would be constantly eroded with the introduction of new, innovative, products and 
processes. The debate about the relationship between market structure and innovation has been going 
on at least since the time of Schumpeter (1954) and yet economists still hold diametrically opposed 
views on the subject, see a relevant discussion on these issues in Nelson and Winter (1982). Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz
 
(1980)
 
build a theoretical model that confirms many intuitive notions concerning the 
relationship between market structure and innovation. In their model, at least for low levels of 
concentration, there is a positive correlation between concentration and R&D effort. In addition, they 
find that there may be excessive duplication of effort in an unregulated economy, i.e. resources 
would be wasted with respect
 
the little cost reduction obtained. As final remark, they find out a pure 
monopolist underinvests in R&D. However, if empirical evidence were to suggest a positive 
correlation between market concentration and innovation, such a correlation would not reveal the 
direction of causality. A school of thought reads the causality relation from costs to market power: 
Low-cost firms increase their market shares at the expense of less efficient firms. As a result, low-
cost firms have large market shares and high concentration is a mark of efficiency.
19
 
2.2. The Economics of Horizontal Mergers: The Coordinated Effects 
Approach 
Mergers pose a risk to competition since increase the likelihood that a collusive outcome prevails 
post merger. Collusion is assumed to be easier to achieve and sustain when there are fewer suppliers 
in the industry. Therefore, reducing the number of competitors tends to facilitate collusive behavior. 
This idea underlies what is referred to as the “structural presumption”, i.e. increases in concentration 
lead to less competitive interactions. The structural presumption idea guided industrial organization 
economists’ research devoted to validating empirically the core idea of the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm: highly concentrated markets tend to have higher prices and higher profits, 
causing greater harm to consumers, than competitive market structures, ceteris paribus.
 
As a matter 
of fact, coordinated-effects theories of harm from horizontal mergers led merger analysis until the 
mid 1980s, at least. 
                                                          
19  Demsetz (1973) pointed out that a positive correlation would also arise if some firms were more efficient than 
competitors, and if the more efficient firms had large market shares. Thus, market concentration would result from the 
presence of larger and more efficient firms. 
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Overall, economists have grown less confident over the past several decades in stating that there is a 
systematic relationship between market concentration and market performance, at least over the 
range of market structures in which there are more than two or three firms. Even so, the Salinger’ s 
(1990, p. 287) cautionary assertion bears repeating today: 
“First, despite the well-known problems with this literature, it continues to affect antitrust 
policy. The inappropriate inferences used to justify an active antitrust policy have given way to 
equally incorrect inferences that have been used to justify a relaxed merger policy. Second, the 
alternative to cross-industry studies is to study specific industries. . . . [I]t is important to realize that 
it was the failure of studies of individual industries to yield general insights that made cross-industry 
studies popular.” 
Nowadays, there is relatively little formal theory exploring the implications for merger policy of the 
relationship between collusion and market concentration. Hence, as instrument of antitrust 
enforcement it might suffer from inconsistency, at least. Notably, contributions by Compte, Jenny, 
and Rey (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005) investigate how the distribution of capacities affects the 
ability of the firms to sustain collusion in price-setting and quantity-setting supergames,
20
 Compte, 
Jenny and Rey (2002) consider the effects of horizontal mergers among asymmetrically capacity-
constrained oligopolists in a repeated Bertrand model; Vasconcelos (2005) studies a repeated 
Cournot game in which firms’ cost functions           depend both upon their output    and capital 
   (a merger of firms i and j leads to a merged firm with capital       ). Similarly, in Kuhn’s 
(2004) repeated price setting model, horizontal mergers join the symmetrically differentiated product 
lines of the merging firms. These papers consider equilibria in which each firm’s profit along any 
equilibrium path is a constant share of aggregate profit.
21
 
Davidson and Deneckere (1984) present a quantity-setting supergame and then a capacity-
constrained price-setting supergame. First, they consider the equilibrium solutions of an infinitely 
repeated firm symmetric  -Cournot game, with linear demand and constant marginal and average 
cost. A first result is the higher post merger price (lower post merger output), which decreases 
consumer surplus. To study collusion they consider the infinitely repeated stage game enforced by 
trigger strategies, i.e. each firm produces its share of cartel output charging cartel price, till one firm 
increases output above its quota. When cheating occurs, economy turns to Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
and future collusion is no longer achievable. As  firms aggregate, they reduce output in each plant 
                                                          
20 The inability of the firms to tacitly collude in a credible fashion, in repeated interaction models, rests on the exogenous 
terminal date at which rivalry ends. Such limitations have been evident at least since Stigler’s (1964) classic paper of 
oligopoly as a problem of policing tacitly collusive agreements. 
21 This simplifies equilibrium analysis since the set of subgame perfect equilibrium values for the firms is one-dimensional. 
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and make it attractive for outsiders to free ride, increasing their own production. Industry equilibrium 
then moves closer to the cartel solution, increasing discount factor. Thus, defection weakens 
punishment lowering future losses, and renders collusion less sustainable.  The results of the price-
setting supergame with capacity constraints and efficient rationing are the same. The gains from 
cheating become more attractive since punishment declines after the merger. Thus, collusion would 
be less likely, as temptation to defect cartel arrangement increases. Horizontal mergers create a 
coalition whose insiders gain from mergers, but confirm that outsiders gain more from the collusive 
agreement than their rivals that actually collude. 
Kovacic et al. (2006) propose a novel way to quantify the coordinated effects dangers when suppliers 
bid for customer’s patronage. They propose measuring the effects of incremental collusion, i.e. 
collusion between two firms, before and after the proposed merger. They show how this calculation 
can be performed in a particular bidding model. Baker (2002) has emphasized the role of maverick 
firms in destabilizing or preventing collusion and thus the particular dangers that arise when a merger 
eliminates such a firm (an idea embraced in the US Merger Guidelines as well). Collusion theory 
indicates that reaching and sustaining an agreement may be difficult if one of the firms expects to 
gain significant market share in the absence of collusion. Therefore, firms with strategies, products, 
or costs that are distinct from those of their rivals, as well as firms that are optimistic and growing 
rapidly, perhaps because they recently entered the market, are obvious candidates to be mavericks. 
Furthermore, merger may actually create a new maverick. 
2.3. The Empirics of Horizontal Mergers 
There are thus several theories that attempt to explain the stylized facts. Mergers need not be 
profitable in several studies analyzing profits, synergies or forms of internal inefficiency, including 
managerial and financial aspects. According to the Thomson Financial Securities Data, 87,804 
mergers and acquisitions were recorded for Europe in the period 1993–2001. In monetary terms, the 
total value of these deals adds up to US$ 5.6 trillion, when the nominal GDP of the European Union 
was US$ 16.8 trillion in 2007 (according to IMF statistics).
22
 Given these numbers, considering only 
the EU, a comprehensive and extended empirical record should be expected to account for the actual 
effects of mergers. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no clear and definitive body of evidence. To some 
extent, this reflects a lack of data: even in those cases where one can accurately measure the prices 
charged before and after a merger, it may be hard to attribute price changes to the merger rather than 
to other changes in industry conditions. Also, the effects of a merger may arise in non-price 
dimensions such as product quality, customer service, or innovation. Furthermore, if merger 
                                                          
22IMF figures are drawn from Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). For more surveys on merger empirics, see Golbe and 
White (1988) and more recently Pautler (2003) , Whinston (2006), and Werden and Froeb (2008).  
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enforcement policy works smoothly, the mergers most likely to have large adverse price effects are 
never proposed or are blocked on antitrust grounds.
 
In the remainder of the chapter, we examine 
several distinct methods for identifying and measuring the effects of mergers. In evaluating this 
evidence, we shall remind that over the past 25 years in the US, only about 2% to 4% of the mergers 
reported every year under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act were considered to raise sufficient antitrust 
issues to warrant a second request from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). This implies that data on the effects of all mergers may not reflect the effects of the 
major horizontal mergers that are most likely to be scrutinized by authorities. 
2.3.1. Stock Market Prices 
One way to measure the effects of mergers is to study the stock market performance of the merging 
firms. Usually, this is done using an event study around the time of the announcement of the merger. 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) provide an excellent introduction to this widespread approach 
in the finance literature. The advantage of this approach is the reliance on detailed and accurate stock 
market data. However, by its nature, this approach cannot distinguish between favorable stock market 
returns based on efficiencies versus market power. 
23
 The stock market being affected by the market 
sentiment and other behavioral phenomena, this approach measures the expectations of investors 
about merger effects, rather than the actual merger effects. Furthermore, this literature is not focused 
on horizontal mergers. The finance literature addresses a more general question: whether mergers and 
acquisitions produce wealth for shareholders or do they reflect managerial hubris.
24
 Finally, event 
studies do not readily disentangle predicted effects of the merger and other information that may be 
signaled by the announcement. Andrade et al. (2001) report abnormal negative returns for acquiring 
firms, based on 1864 deals from the 1990s: 1.0% during a three-day window around the 
announcement and 3.9% during a longer window from 20 days prior to the announcement through 
closing of the deal. However, target firms showed a 16% abnormal positive return during the three-
day window. The combined firms gained about 1.5% over the short or longer window. Further 
several studies report negative abnormal returns over the three to five years following the completion 
of mergers, Andrade et al. state: (p. 112): 
                                                          
23 In principle, a merger that would lead to synergies and lower prices would depress the stock market value of rivals, while 
an anticompetitive merger that would lead to higher prices through unilateral or coordinated effects would boost the stock 
market value of rivals. 
24 Managerial aggrandissement and executives’ self interest in power and control might lead to overvaluation of the target 
by bidding firms. Within these boundaries, Roll (1986) proposed the “Hubris hypothesis”: his bold view on merger activity 
interprets takeovers as moved by managers’ hubris, rather than pure economic gains for the firms they manage. By paying a 
premium, for the acquired firms, managers impose their own valuation of the target, on the one the (assumed efficient) 
markets had expressed. 
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“In fact, some authors find that the long-term negative drift in acquiring firm stock prices 
overwhelms the positive combined stock price reaction at announcement, making the net wealth 
effect negative.” 
However, Andrade et al. are skeptical of these results, disputing the reliability of these longer-term 
studies, given that it is hard to understand what the “normal” return should be over these longer 
periods of time. In the end, Andrade et al. state (p. 117):  
“We are inclined to defend the traditional view that mergers improve efficiency and that the 
gains to shareholders at merger announcement accurately reflect improved expectations of future 
cash flow performance. But the conclusion must be defended from several recent challenges.” 
Andrade et al. uphold the view of efficiency enhancing mergers, although recognizing the potential 
challenges of this approach. For instance, the source of the stock market gains to the combined firms 
from mergers has not been identified. In the case of horizontal mergers, at least, those gains could 
come from enhanced market power. Moreover, acquiring firms do not seem to benefit from mergers, 
an uncomfortable fact for those who believe in a reasonably efficient stock market.  
2.3.2. Accounting measures of firm performance 
A second method for measuring the effects of mergers is to study accounting data for the firms 
involved, looking for changes in variables such as rates of return, cash flows, or profit margins. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989), using widely cited FTC Line of Business Data, gather mixed 
evidence,
25
 reaching rather negative conclusions on their observations and results (collected for just 
three years, from 1974–1976): the relevant parts of the mergers and acquisitions they study were 
unsuccessful, leading to a decline in the post-merger profitability of the acquired line of business. 
Their contributions uphold the view of excessive managerial zeal about acquisitions. However, their 
prime investigation subjects are conglomerate mergers, not horizontal mergers; thus, much of their 
evidence is not directly relevant to horizontal merger control policy. In particular, they find that 
horizontal mergers tended to be more profitable than conglomerate mergers. However, this result 
does not distinguish between increased market power and post-merger greater synergies in horizontal 
combinations. 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) examine post-merger operating performance for the fifty largest 
mergers that took place from 1979 to 1984. They find that the merged firms exhibited improved 
                                                          
25 This is also consistent with the event–study analysis of stock price returns, which finds wide variation in how the market 
evaluates announced mergers. At the same time, as the case studies in Kaplan (2000) document, a merger’s performance 
may result very different from the stock market’s initial forecast. 
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operating performance, as measured by operating cash flows, with respect to their industry peers. 
They attribute these gains to increased operating efficiency. Along similar lines, Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1987) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) have examined data from the years following the 
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s.
26
 Lichtenberg and Siegel examine the effect of ownership 
changes on statistically estimated total factor productivity
27
 at the plant-level using the Census 
Bureau’s Longitudinal Establishment Data (LED) for the years 1972–1981.  They reported that 
acquired plants had lower productivity than industry averages prior to acquisition. At the same time, 
registered productivity increases after the acquisition brought acquired plants almost up to the 
industry average. These results may overturn the Ravenscraft and Scherer’s inefficient conglomerate 
mergers. The LED database, however, contains primarily large plants. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) 
study the same question using instead the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) 
for the years 1977–1987. They restrict attention to mergers occurring between 1977 and 1982 and 
focus on the food manufacturing industry (SIC 20). This sample includes many more small plants 
than in Lichtenberg and Siegel’s analysis. It also includes plants that only operated during part of the 
sample period (an “unbalanced panel”), while Lichtenberg and Siegel used a balanced panel. 
However, instead of a measure of total factor productivity most of their analysis uses labor 
productivity (the average product of labor relative to the industry average product), which can be 
affected by shifts in the mix of inputs. In contrast to Lichtenberg and Siegel, McGuckin and Nguyen 
find that acquired plants have above-average productivity prior to acquisition, although they find that 
this is not true when they restrict attention to large plants like those studied by Lichtenberg and 
Siegel. Like Lichtenberg and Siegel, they find post-merger productivity improvements.  
2.3.3. Case Studies 
A third approach is to study specific mergers, tracking the firms or industries involved, looking at 
industry-wide measures (and not individual accounting data) such as prices, output, product quality, 
or R&D intensity. In principle, one can also try to measure the impact of a merger on rivals or 
customers. Kaplan (2000) provides a useful collection of case studies of mergers in a diverse set of 
industries, including hospitals, tires, banks, pharmaceutical drugs, airlines, and oil field services. 
These studies illustrate the great variety of patterns that arise in merger analysis, the important role of 
mergers as a means by which industry participants adjust to changing market conditions (making it 
                                                          
26 The corporate merger wave raised in 1965, picked three years later, and faded in 1972. Acquiring firms were on average 
much larger than other companies, this may imply internal growth rates of the largest companies were less than the growth 
in assets for the manufacturing sector as a whole, see for this idea White (1981). 
27 Total factor productivity is determined in much of their work as the residual from estimation of a Cobb–Douglas 
production function. 
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especially hard to distinguish the effects of mergers from other industry changes, especially once one 
recognizes that firms self-select to participate in mergers), and the risks as well as opportunities 
associated with mergers. 
Airline mergers have received great attention, in no small part because good data on fares are 
available and one can use fares on other routes as a good benchmark when measuring the effects of 
mergers on fares. Borenstein (1990), Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1991), and Peters (2003) study 
two mid-1980s airline mergers, approved by the Department of Transportation over the objections of 
the DOJ: the merger of Northwest Airlines (NW) with Republic Airlines (RC), and the merger of 
Trans World Airlines (TWA) with Ozark Airlines. These mergers raised significant antitrust issues 
because they combined directly competing hubs: Northwest and Republic both had hubs at 
Minneapolis, and TWA and Ozark both had hubs at St. Louis. Both mergers began in 1985; their 
final agreements were reached in the first quarter of 1986, and cleared in the third quarter of 1986. 
Borenstein (1990) reveal very different experiences following the two mergers. The NW/RC merger 
caused significant fare increases, whereas the TWA/Ozark merger did not. Borenstein pointed that 
prices also increased on routes in which NW and RC did not compete prior to the merger. This could 
reflect a price-constraining effect due to the threat of potential entrants prior to the merger, increased 
market power arising from domination of the hub airport after the merger, or in the case of markets in 
which NW and RC faced actual competitors, the effects of increased levels of multimarket contact 
with competitor airlines. Borenstein also notes that the prices of other airlines on these routes 
displayed a pattern very similar to the pattern seen for the merging firms. Werden, Joskow, and 
Johnson (1991) found that the Northwest/Republic merger raised fares by about 5% and the 
TWA/Ozark merger raised fares by about 1.5%, and that both mergers led to significant service 
reductions. 
Kim and Singal (1993) examine fourteen mid-1980s airline mergers. They compare price changes on 
the routes served by the merging firms with price changes on other routes of the same distance and 
conclude that any efficiency gains in mergers between rival airlines were more than offset by 
enhanced market power, leading to fares that averaged 10% higher after six to nine months. Fare 
increases were especially large for mergers involving airlines in bankruptcy, which had unusually 
low (perhaps unsustainably low) pre-merger fares. Examining price changes for the merging firms, 
relative prices rose by an average of 3.25% over the full sample period in mergers involving firms 
that were not financially distressed. They rose substantially more (26.25%) in mergers involving a 
financially distressed firm. Peters (2003) focusing on the evaluation of merger simulation techniques 
also documents the service changes and entry events that followed six of these mergers. Peters shows 
that flight frequency tended to decrease in markets that initially were served by both merging firms, 
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and increase in markets that initially were served by only one of the merging firms.
28
 The mergers 
also led to entry, although changes in the number of rivals were only statistically significant for three 
of the mergers. 
The banking industry is another industry in which good price data are available and many horizontal 
mergers have occurred, making it possible to measure the price effects of horizontal mergers. Prager 
and Hannan (1998) study the effects of major horizontal mergers in the U.S. banking from January 
1992 through June 1994. Prager and Hannan examine the change in interest rates paid on deposits for 
NOW accounts (interest-bearing checking accounts), MMDA accounts (personal money market 
deposit accounts), and 3MOCD accounts (three-month certificates of deposit). Hannan and Prager 
separately examine the effects of “substantial horizontal mergers” in which the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index in the affected market increases by at least 200 points to a post-merger value of at 
least 1800, and “less substantial mergers”, in which the Herfindahl–Hirschman index increases by at 
least 100 points to a post merger value of at least 1400 and which were not “substantial mergers”. 
Their price data are monthly observations on deposit interest rates from October 1991 through 
August 1994. The results indicate that substantial mergers reduce the rates that banks in a market 
offer. This effect is largest for NOWaccounts (approximately a 17% reduction in rates), for which 
customers arguably have the strongest attachment to local banks, and least for three-month CD’s 
(less than 2% reduction in rates, and not statistically significant). 
Notably, however, Prager and Hannan find that less substantial mergers increase rates paid in the 
market. One possible interpretation of this difference is that these mergers involve efficiencies 
(which allow banks, in the absence of other effects, to increase their rates), but the effects of these 
efficiencies on prices are more than offset by an increase in market power for substantial mergers. 
Unlike in Kim and Singal (1993), the direction of these effects is the same in the pre and post-merger 
period. Finally, although the results in Table 36.8 do not distinguish between the price changes for 
merging firms and their rivals, Prager and Hannan find that these two groups had similar price 
effects, paralleling the Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993) findings on this point. In a 
recent paper, Focarelli and Panetta (2003) study bank mergers in Italy during the years 1990–1998 
and their effects on deposit rates. Like Kim and Singal (1993) and Prager and Hannan (1998), they 
separately look at announcement (which they call “transition”) and completion periods. Focarelli and 
Panetta look at a much longer time period after the merger when examining the completion period 
(for each merger, they consider the effects until the end of their sample), arguing the necessity of a 
long time period to realize efficiencies post-merger. Like Kim and Singal they find evidence of 
market power effects during the announcement/transition period as deposit rates fall during this 
                                                          
28 Borenstein (1990) and Werden, Joskow and Johnson (1991) notice similar changes in the service immediately after the 
NW/RC and TW/OZ mergers. 
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period. However, they find that in the long run these mergers increased deposit rates. Thus, in this 
case, the price-reducing effects of merger-related efficiencies seem to have dominated the price-
increasing effects of increased market power. They find that substantial horizontal mergers reduce 
the deposit interest rates offered by the merging banks. 
Some recent studies have been done as well in other industries in which price data are available. 
Horizontal mergers are explicitly studied is Pesendorfer (2003), investigating a horizontal merger 
wave in the paper industry during the mid 1980s. Rather than estimating productivity directly, 
Pesendorfer tries to infer pre- and post-merger productivity using the firms’ capacity choices. 
Marginal costs are inferred from the Cournot profit-maximization first-order conditions for capacity 
choice. This idea has been found not entirely convincing in his application. First critique involves the 
investment first order conditions Pesendorfer uses. These are entirely static, while investment choices 
are likely to be affected by dynamic considerations. Second, his procedure relies on an assumed 
investment cost function (this might not be necessary if one instead has panel data). Finally, one 
cannot distinguish whether the changes in marginal cost he derives reflect shifts of the plant’s 
marginal cost function or movements along an unchanging function. 
Taylor and Hosken (2004) study the effects of a 1997 joint venture that combined the refining and 
retail gas station operations of the Marathon and Ashland oil companies. Specifically, they examine 
retail and wholesale price changes in Louisville, Kentucky, a city where this merger raised 
concentration significantly (the wholesale Herfindahl–Hirschman index increased from 1477 to 2263; 
the retail index increased by over 250, ending up in the 1500–1600 range). They conclude that there 
is no evidence that the merger caused either wholesale or retail prices to increase. In contrast, 
Hastings (2004) finds that rivals’ prices increased following ARCO’s 1997 acquisition (through long-
term lease) of 260 stations from Thrifty, an unbranded retailer. Vita and Sacher (2001) document 
large price increases arising from a 1990 merger between the only two hospitals in the city of Santa 
Cruz, California. The acquirer in this case was a non-profit hospital.  
There is one important caveat to the interpretations we have been giving to observed price changes in 
these studies: homogeneity of the product market is a crucial assumption, i.e. product remains 
unchanged post-merger. An alternative explanation for price increases or decreases instead may be 
that the merger led to changes in the quality of the merged firms’ products. Thus, rather than market 
power, price increases may reflect quality improvements; and rather than cost reductions, price 
decreases may reflect quality degradation buying cheaper inputs of production. Many of the papers 
surveyed above document patterns that tend to rule out such interpretations of their findings. For 
instance, the price increases during the Kim and Singal (1993) announcement period are unlikely to 
come from quality improvements. Likewise, Focarelli and Panetta (2003) explicitly examine and 
reject the hypothesis that the long-run increases in merging banks’ interest rates that they document 
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are due to quality degradation. In summary, the literature documenting price effects of mergers has 
shown that mergers can lead to either price increases or decreases, in keeping with the central market 
power versus efficiency trade-off. 
2.4. Riding the Wave 
The Reagan era has widely been pointed by newspapers as the most financially intense for horizontal 
takeovers. Nonetheless, recent empirical studies show that even greater merger activity occurred at 
earlier times.
 
It is not so easy to find consistent data on merger activity, especially in the first periods, 
except for mining and manufacturing, industries declining over time in the U.S. economy. Moreover, 
early data sources report high-valued transactions, rendering merger activity measures downward 
biased, ignoring mergers among small firms. Stock market booms seem to have fostered merger 
activity, more precisely, extensive aggregations took place close to the turn of the twentieth century, 
then again in the late 1920’s, the third in the 1960’s, the fourth in 1980’s and 1990’s. 
Stigler (1950) defined the first wave as the “merger to monopoly” movement, form 1893 to 1903. 
The 1920’s was baptized by Stigler (1950) as the “merger to oligopoly” movement, pointing to the 
follow-up mergers in the industries involved in the first merger wave, transforming declining- 
dominant -firm markets into oligopoly. Taking off in 1926, it landed after the stock market crash in 
October 1929. Consumer goods innovations, e.g. cheaper automobiles and commercial radio, paired 
the financial market innovations, supplying an insatiable demand with new securities. The merger 
movement of the second part of the century had very different characteristics as it was conglomerate 
in nature, it created either conglomerate businesses or holding companies owning several firms 
selling in different product markets. The most recent waves of takeovers, the Deal Decade eighties 
and the nineties, prove themselves unparalleled both in the number of mergers and in the nominal 
value of mergers, i.e. not adjusted to inflation. In fiscal 1997, the justice department received 3,702 
merger notifications, more than doubling the 1992 record of 1,589.  The nominal value of mergers 
increased from nearly $200 billion in 1990, to over $900 billion in 1997. 
The fact that such takeovers happen in waves gave rise to an almost independent stream of research 
to detect the determinants, both financial and behavioral, of these phenomena. Research shows that a 
few factors are needed for a merger wave. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) show merger activity as positively correlated with high stock market valuations, 
developing models that result in merger waves following managerial timing in overvaluation of their 
firms. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) present a more neoclassical explanation of waves as market 
response industry shock, e.g. deregulation, technology or preferences, disturbing the status quo. Such 
shocks require large scale reallocation of assets, leaving some weaker that others, so there is room for 
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merger deals. Managers' payoffs can amplify the wave, as competing executives try to emulate their 
rivals by surging to industry leaders outperforming industry laggards. 
The fact that bouts of intense merger activity happen at the same time across many different 
industries suggests microeconomic shocks are perhaps necessary, but not sufficient for a merger 
wave. Harford (2005) shows to what extent capital liquidity, e.g. reduction of financial constraints or 
corporate savings, accommodate such a reallocation of assets.  Testing the neoclassical hypothesis, in 
which industries reorganize to shocks by a stream of takeovers; and the behavioral model in which 
rational managers take advantage of consistent pricing errors to buy real assets with overvalued 
stocks. The tests support such a neoclassical view, modified to embrace macroeconomic 
determinants. Such capital market variables demonstrate how the positive correlation has been 
misattributed to behavioral misevaluation factors. Although industry-specific shocks are cause of 
mergers not necessarily propagate to a merger wave. The macro-level liquidity, reducing transaction 
costs, justifies the clustering of mergers in a wave that behavioral factors alone would not. 
Whenever firms get so big they cannot be allowed to fall over, concerns may arise. Being too big to 
fail, allows government intervention in giants support, affecting industry-wide price incentive, i.e. 
creating a distortion and pushing the industry farther from perfect competition. This may be seen as a 
rent seeking behavior on the side of firms alienating objective function from profits to governmental 
subsidy maximizing. Post Global Financial Crisis empirical research may point the lens on this 
peculiar aspect and investigate the role of State intervention by National Governments, Central Banks 
and financial Authorities, to prevent the contagion effect and save national economies from timeless 
paralysis. 
3. Symmetric Pricing Games 
This chapter investigates the different oligopolistic settings studied in the literature of capacity-
constrained price competition. Homogeneous product oligopoly models à la Bertrand-Edgeworth 
have long been challenging for economists’ intellects since Levitan and Shubik’s (1972) modern 
approach to Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. Thorough equilibrium characterization will be 
necessary to address horizontal merger analysis in the following chapter. Much of the literature we 
survey in this chapter considers symmetrically-sized firms, focusing on symmetric equilibria. Levitan 
and Shubik (1972) calculated the equilibrium in mixed strategies for the efficient rationing rule in the 
special case of symmetric capacities.
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29 Induction from symmetric frameworks to asymmetric ones is troublesome and the bulk of economic analysis does not 
necessarily extend to the finite asymmetric  -player game. Mixed strategy equilibria in price competition have reached only 
specific results from specific assumptions and asymmetric oligopolies represent an extensively unknown field of economic 
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Under the same assumptions Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) characterized the duopolistic mixed-
strategy equilibrium for asymmetric capacities in a two-stage capacity and pricing game. Between 
asymmetric players the largest firm has a stronger incentive to raise price since its residual demand is 
the largest. This property of duopoly can be easily extended to oligopoly. Further extensions of the 
Kreps and Scheinkman’s construction have been considered by Osborne and Pitchick (1986) for non-
concave demand functions, as well as by Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) for non-identical unit cost 
structures between the duopolists. Brock and Scheinkman (1985) consider a repeated price game in a 
general oligopoly characterizing equilibrium payoffs in the stage game assuming symmetry among 
oligopolists’ dimension. Furthermore, symmetric games have received full attention and complete 
formalization for the efficient rationing rule of residual demand in Davidson and Deneckere (1984), 
Vives (1986), and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b). 
Davidson and Deneckere (1984) investigate a price-setting supergame to study pro-collusive effects 
among active sellers. The symmetric oligopoly is assumed of a given number of equally capacity-
constrained competitors some of which merge to create a bigger firm, whose size is a proper multiple 
of the merging firms. The post-merger oligopoly is a particularly asymmetric market constituted of 
one large competitor acting as a size leader and the unchanged remainder of the industry. Mixed 
strategy equilibria are then characterized when the post-merger capacity configuration falls in the 
mixed strategy region. While Davidson and Deneckere (1984) restricted equilibrium investigation to 
symmetric equilibria, in a related work De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b) further characterized the 
mixed strategy region. In the finer partitioning of the mixed strategy region, they recognize the 
possibility of the rise of a multiplicity, sometimes a continuum, of equilibria. Nonetheless, they show 
the uniqueness of the payoff of each firm in any equilibrium. Vives (1986) shows how in a 
symmetric oligopoly the support of equilibrium prices converges to the competitive price. 
This preliminary presentation will be needed to understand how deeper investigation of equilibrium 
properties is required to set solid grounds on the upcoming research of mergers in a specific 
oligopolistic context as the one studied in this essay. More specific and analytical presentation of 
merger theory will be studied and applied in the next chapter. Section 1 introduces the properties of 
models à la Bertrand-Edgeworth. Section 2 and 3 present the symmetric and almost symmetric 
oligopolies. Section 4 and 5 introduce horizontal mergers modeling in price-setting oligopolies, 
providing a full characterization of post merger equilibria. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
theory. Hirata (2008) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010a) have presented characterization of the mixed strategy region 
in triopoly. Full characterization of the mixed strategy region in triopoly is supplied in De Francesco and Salvadori (2013b). 
These latter models introduce concerns about extension of asymmetric duopoly results to asymmetric markets. 
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3.1. Oligopoly, Oligopolies 
Assume an  -firm oligopoly whose set of players   {     } is fixed and exogenous, i.e. entry and 
exit is not allowed in this model. The     firms produce a homogeneous good, at equal constant 
average and marginal cost  , set to zero without loss of generality, up to capacity. Neither installation 
costs of the existing capacity nor fixed costs are considered in this analysis. Define total capacity as 
  ∑   
 
  and assume the subset of capacity space where, without loss of generality,         . 
Consumers preferences determine the following demand function       , where   refers to total 
market demanded quantity and   to market price. Market demand is positive for       ̃ , where if 
   ̃ , then       . Furthermore, demand function is assumed continuous, decreasing and 
concave in     ̃ . Conversely, the inverse demand function is defined for the decreasing part of the 
demand function such as              , in   (      ). 
Homogeneity of the product market implies no perceived difference among the sellers. Thus, we 
assume consumers buy first from the cheapest supplier, absent income effects. When the lowest 
priced firm cannot satisfy the market, residual demand is left for the other competitors. The amount 
of sales of the higher priced firms depends on the form of their contingent demand curve, i.e. the pool 
of customers that remains to be served. In this dissertation, any rationing of the forthcoming demand 
follows the efficient or surplus maximizing rule.
30
 Consequently, let     be the set of firms charging 
price  , and write the residual demand for firms setting   as max ,       ∑         -      . If 
∑              , the residual demand forthcoming to any firm        is a fraction 
              of     , namely               (         )    . Our analysis does not depend 
on the specific assumptions on   (         ). For instance, it is consistent with   (         )  
  ∑         ⁄ , as well as with evenly sharing residual demand assumption, among firms in     .
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Additionally, when firms set the same price, demand will distribute proportionally to individual 
capacities. These two assumptions allow writing sales and profits of firm   as            
max ,       ∑          -
  
∑          
 and              min{             }. 
                                                          
30  An alternative rationing rule, i.e. proportional rationing, allows writing residual demand as 
     
 (  )
[ (  )    ] , for 
      . For this rationing unsatisfied demand for lower-priced firms turns to higher-priced ones only at discounted rates, 
since customers exit the market if not able to purchase at the desired price. For research with this rationing, see Allen and 
Hellwig (1986, 1993), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b), and Cheviakov and Hartwick (2005). For further research with non 
efficient rationings, see Chowdhury (2003, 2008). 
31  In this case,   (         )  min{           ⁄ }  where      is the solution in   of equation 
∑ min{      ⁄   }        . Let       and      , each       . Then, ∑ min{      ⁄   }       is increasing in 
  over the range [        ⁄ ] and equal to ∑    {      ⁄ }          for         ⁄ . 
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The static  -firm price-setting oligopoly model can be represented as a one shot pricing game, i.e. 
firms name their price simultaneously and non-cooperatively. All firms have perfect computational 
abilities, act with perfect rationality and foresight, and know with certainty that the same is true for 
all of their competitors. Formally, we write the normal form of a simultaneous move game when we 
consider only nonrandom strategy choices     [  {  } {          }]. Where   denotes the finite 
set of players,    denotes the set of strategies of each individual player  , and            the payoff 
function assigning the profit levels associated with the outcome arising from oligopolists’ 
strategies                     , with       and        where        [   ̃]. We define the 
profile of pure strategies for any player  ’s opponent by                          . Let 
     x  x    and        x  x     x      x   . To solve for equilibrium strategy, i.e. 
equilibrium price, we solve for the Nash equilibrium concept. A strategy profile             
constitutes a Nash equilibrium of game    [  {  } {          }] if for every    , 
                       for all      . Informally, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no 
player can improve by unilaterally changing her strategy. 
According to the assumptions on industry capacity, it is possible to address pure strategy equilibria 
more formally. Let    indicate the competitive equilibrium price, the solutions in the pure strategies 
space, for null marginal cost, are as follows 
   {
        
           
 
In capacity-constrained oligopolies, pure strategy equilibria differ according to individual firm size 
vis-à-vis industry size. 
If             , in every Nash equilibrium at least two firms set marginal cost pricing, while the 
rivals charge whatever price not lower than marginal cost. Whenever two firms price at marginal 
cost, each firm   of the     firms left will be indifferent on charging any other price at least equal 
to  , since it would still earn null profits. At the same time, each of the   firms pricing at marginal 
cost, has no incentive to price differently. Pricing higher, as well as pricing lower, would gain 
respectively either null or negative profits to the firm, and do not represent equilibrium positions. By 
way of contradiction, assume no one, or just one firm charges marginal cost price to show there 
exists no equilibrium. If only firm   adopts marginal cost pricing, then it would be optimal to increase 
price up to a slightly lower price than the minimum price charged by the     rival firms. Hence, 
firm   would supply the entire market demand and earn positive profits. If no firm charges marginal 
cost pricing, then at least one has incentive to undercut rivals to a lower price than the minimum 
price to serve the whole market demand. 
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This assumption is particularly strong, in fact gives rise to the standard Bertrand result. It considers 
firms that are individually so big to supply the whole forthcoming demand at marginal cost. This is 
not the only case in which this result arises in such games. It is sufficient assuming the     
smallest firms to satisfy the whole forthcoming demand at marginal cost, i.e. the sum of all firms’ 
capacities but the largest, can supply all the demand at marginal cost pricing. Following this second 
assumption, if each firm owns a capacity    such that ∑   
 
        , then the equilibrium will be in 
pure strategies. The sum of individual capacities allow the firms to serve market demand at any pure 
strategy equilibrium price    . The following proposition establishes the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium and its uniqueness. 
Proposition 3.1 
(i)     
       is an equilibrium if and only if either 
          if                (3.1) 
Or 
     
 [     ]     if               (3.2) 
(ii) Whenever either one or the other holds, all firms earn competitive profits at each pure strategy 
equilibrium and    is the unique equilibrium if       . 
Proof: The two points will be shown in turn, 
(i) If       , charging      is a best response of firm   to rivals charging    if and only if 
∑           . This holds for each   if and only if ∑           . If       , charging  
  is 
a best response of firm   to rivals charging   , if and only if [ [ (     ∑      )]   ⁄ ]     
 . This is true for each   if and only if      
 [     ]    . 
(ii) In order to show uniqueness, it is left scrutinize strategy profiles such that  ̂    , where 
 ̂  max{       }. Assume first    ̂  ∑         ̂   . If #   ̂   , then at least some firm 
charging  ̂ serves a residual demand (strictly) lower than its capacity. It would raise its profits 
quoting  ̂   , a slightly lower price than  ̂ , producing the quantity min ,      ̂     
∑         ̂  - rather than the lower *   ̂  ∑         ̂ +   (         )    . If #   ̂   , any 
firm      ̂  is marketing its entire capacity, though not responding optimally: raising its price 
keeping it below  ̂, would gain the firm higher profits selling all capacity. Next assume    ̂  
∑         ̂   . To optimally react to rivals and charge a lower price than the lowest  ̌, then it 
must be  ̌    and ∑               (the latter requires       ). Firms will earn the 
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competitive null profits. But then, in order for each firm   charging  ̌ to have also made a best 
response, it must be ∑                  .Q.E.D. 
Thus, pure strategy equilibria in which  ̂     may only exist if inequalities (3.1) hold, so the set of 
equilibria being any strategy profile such that ∑                   for each  , such that      . 
Informally, since it will not increase their profits, firms can choose neither a lower price, nor a higher 
one than the null marginal cost, i.e. the standard Bertrand result. If inequalities (3.2) hold then a 
unique pure strategy equilibrium exists and     . The term    [     ]     in condition (3.2) can 
also be interpreted as the Cournot-Nash best response quantity in capacity-unconstrained quantity 
competition. Assuming    , [ [ (     ∑      )]   ⁄ ]       is equivalent to the one, 
   
 
   
         for       and      , each    . Thus, condition (3.2) identifies the region of 
the           capacity space in which each firm’s capacity is not greater than its best response 
quantity when the rivals produce at full capacity.
32
 As a consequence, the existence of a pure strategy 
equilibrium depends on industry capacity and the individual capacity of each firm. Either inequalities 
(3.1) or (3.2) hold if and only if  
   max {         
 [     ]    }       (3.3) 
Inequality (3.3) states that the largest firm must be sufficiently small with respect to industry 
capacity, in order for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist. Whenever inequalities (3.1) or (3.2) are 
violated, pure strategy equilibrium does not exist while mixed strategy equilibria do. That is to say 
that mixed strategy equilibrium exists if   
  max {          [     ]    }        (3.4) 
In the mixed strategy region equilibrium always exists satisfying the sufficient conditions for 
existence of Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a). In the theory of games, a player is said to 
play a mixed strategy whenever chooses randomly over a set of available actions. Formally, a mixed 
strategy is a probability distribution assigning to each available action a likelihood of being selected. 
A pure strategy is a particular case of mixed strategy in which the mass of the distribution function is 
concentrated at one point. Formally, we write the normal form of a simultaneous move game 
   [  {   } {          }]  allowing for players randomizing over pure strategies. We let the 
mixed strategy equilibrium profile as (             )          . We define the mixed strategy 
profile of any player  ’s opponent mixed strategy                          . By definition, 
                                                          
32 The region is namely the region bounded above by the lower envelope of the Cournot best-response functions. Note that 
the assumptions on capacity do not guarantee the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium. Uniqueness would be assured if 
                on (      ), see Deneckere and Kovenock (1992).  
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   Pr      , i.e. the probability that firm   sets a lower price than  . Mixed strategies bear the 
common properties of cumulative distribution functions such as,      when       is increasing in 
 , i.e.                , for any        , whereas      if                 for 
some    . Furthermore,       is discontinuous at any  
 , such that Pr     
    . We write 
expected equilibrium profits,   
            when the equilibrium mixed strategies          are 
played. Similarly, firm  ’s expected profits whenever it plays any price   and the others the 
equilibrium mixed strategy    , can be written            . Unless otherwise proved, the 
equilibrium mixed strategies vector is not necessarily unique. Furthermore, let      (     ) the 
support of equilibrium mixed strategies and let   
   
and    
   
 the infimum and supremum of   , 
respectively. We define    min   
   
 and    max   
   
 together with sets  ,     
   
   - and 
  ,     
   
   -. It is then straightforward,   
                as well as   
          , 
almost everywhere, for     .
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In Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) the following mixed strategies equilibria general properties have 
been found for duopoly. Mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized by   
   
   
   
    
argmax            ,                  if       , whereas               
  if       , then   
               for   such that      . Recent generalizations to 
oligopoly can be summarized in the following proposition. These results are obtained as a 
straightforward generalization of duopoly findings and demonstrated in De Francesco and Salvadori 
(2010a), as well as other authors in sometimes different, though analogous frameworks. 
Proposition 3.2 
1)    argmax   (     ∑      ). 
2)   
   
               . 
3)   
   max   (     ∑      )           . 
4)    max { ̅  ̿}, where we define  ̅    
   ⁄  and  ̿ as the lower solution of the equation in    
 1
*       ; if      ,   
   
     ̅,           . 
5)   (  
   
)   ,           . 
                                                          
33 It might exist at most a finite set of isolated points       (such that     
         
      , any     small 
enough), hence   
            
   . 
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6) If      ,         . If      ,   (  
   
)           and                
[     ] and          . 
7) If         , then   
    
  and necessarily                      unless   
         
were independent of       ( in such a case even   
 (        ) is not independent of       ). 
8)   
                . 
9)     (∑      ). 
10)   
    
                      and then Pr                     . 
11)      and     . 
12)             {      }   . 
Among the results of Proposition 3.2, in every mixed equilibrium the highest-capacity firms earn 
Stackelberg follower’s profits, i.e. profits that the firm makes when it reacts optimally to the other’s 
output (assumed up to full capacity). The result follows from Boccard and Wauthy (2000) and De 
Francesco (2003), who develop a two-stage model with a finite number of asymmetric firms. Only 
the largest firm’s equilibrium payoff and strategic profile is examined in the price competition game, 
lacking of full characterization of the equilibrium strategic profile.
34
 Moreover       is continuous 
       , and the supremum    is charged with positive probability only by the largest firm, firm 1 
in the case that      . The definitions of    and    also make it possible to characterize the 
mixed strategies region where inequalities (3.4) and            hold. Inequality (3.4) can be 
substituted with 
                            (3.4’) 
Indeed, if          then             ; whereas, if     
 [     ]     then       
       . Conversely, if inequality (3.4) holds, then inequality (3.4’) holds as well. Finally, note 
that in the region where inequalities (3.4) and            hold the extrema of equilibrium 
mixed strategies supports are defined in points 1 and 4 for the supremum and infimum respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
34 The analysis under convex costs is similar: full characterization of equilibrium is not available, although the existence of 
mixed strategy equilibrium is proved in Dixon (1984) and Maskin (1986). Additional assumptions are studied in Dixon 
(1987) and Chowdhury (2008). 
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3.2. Symmetric Oligopoly 
Vives (1986) studies symmetric equilibria
35
  in a price game with symmetric firms, under efficient 
rationing. Vives (1986) demonstrates that the supports of the symmetric mixed strategies Nash 
equilibria converge, in distribution, to the unique competitive price. Although in Vives (1986) 
existence of asymmetric equilibria is not excluded, it is not yet investigated. Uniqueness of 
symmetric equilibrium is shown in De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b). Drawing on the conclusions 
of Proposition 3.2 allows to show the necessary symmetry of equilibrium and, therefore, its 
uniqueness. 
Proposition 3.3 Let         {     } . Then, there exist the unique symmetric 
equilibrium 
      [
       
 (      )
]
 
   
      {       }   [     ]      (3.5) 
Where   
   max                ,    argmax                and      
  ⁄  . 
Proof: From Proposition 3.2 it follows: equilibrium is symmetric (point 6) , expected equilibrium 
profit is unique (3), as well as unique are supports’ extrema    and   , (2 and 4) where      
  ⁄ , 
independent of the existence of a multiplicity of equilibria. It follows that it exists a neighborhood of 
   in which 
    ∏                    
   
 [  ∏     
   
]    ∏                  
   
 
     {       }   [     ], where equality (3.4) holds. Thus, it exists an equilibrium in which 
     (     )  [     ],      {       }. In (3.4) the RHS is strictly increasing           .
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Uniqueness of equilibrium can be found showing that no other symmetric equilibrium exists. In such 
hypothetical equilibria, equation (3.4) may not hold if            . It must then be          
in         , i.e. Pr(     
      )   . This would imply, 
  
          ∏    
                
   
  
    ∏    
                 
   
 
                                                          
35 “Given n firms and restricting attention to symmetric equilibria ” Vives (1986, p. 114). 
36 It is straightforward to find that   
 
      if and only if           (             )   . Since        
        , then we write                  ,    . Rearranging, [  
                ]  
[       ]   , that is true since each term in brackets is positive. 
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In a right neighborhood of     profit function will be increasing, contradicting assumptions.37  Q.E.D. 
In Vives (1986) only the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium is defined, assuming symmetric 
equilibria, for equally sized firms. Upholding Vives (1986) result, in De Francesco and Salvadori 
(2010b) is offered the necessary proof of uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium. Assuming 
symmetric equilibria unfolds not very restrictive since the symmetric equilibrium is the unique 
equilibrium of the game. Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium holds not only for the equally-
sized firm game, but also for the game in which the capacity of the largest firm is sufficiently close to 
the smallest one, i.e. an “almost symmetric oligopoly”. In an almost symmetric oligopoly,       
   and                 . Such oligopoly is investigated and characterized in De Francesco 
and Salvadori (2013a). In the closing section of this chapter we shall consider an almost symmetric 
triopoly and show the necessary proof for the existence of the equilibrium mixed strategies. 
Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium holds not only for the equally-sized firms game, but for the 
game in which the capacity of the largest firm is sufficiently close to the smallest one, i.e. the “almost 
symmetric oligopoly”. In an almost symmetric oligopoly size differences should follows,       
   and                 . The last equation can be rewritten as                  
      that holds for capacities that are quite close to one another, i.e. for capacity regions that are 
sufficiently close to the symmetric case. The sufficient conditions of existence of the unique 
equilibrium obtained for the mentioned size configurations, as well as those matching somewhat 
weaker conditions is referred to De Francesco and Salvadori (2013a). 
3.3. One Large Firm and Small Symmetric Firms Oligopoly 
Besides Vives (1986) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b), Davidson and Deneckere (1984) 
investigate the stage game of a symmetric  -firm oligopoly of a pricing supergame, to detect pro-
collusive effects of horizontal mergers. It is shown that in a price-setting supergame a higher degree 
of concentration in the market does not necessarily lead to higher sustainability of collusion. On the 
contrary, somewhat counterintuitive, collusion will be less sustainable since punishment is expected 
softer. Although the coordinated effects approach is not the aim of this thesis, Davidson and 
Deneckere’s characterization of the equilibrium mixed strategies and profits will be necessary to 
investigate the effects on profitability and industry price of horizontal mergers. 
The model considers horizontal mergers occurrence to gain market power and allow merged firm to 
twist the terms of trade to its advantage. Opposed to quantity competition models, where the merged 
                                                          
37  Formally in a neighborhood of   ,    (       
  )   ⁄     (       
  )   ⁄  ∏     
   [               
      ]  [  ∏     
     ]   . 
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entity is equally-sized with respect to market competitors, the merged firm combines constituents’ 
assets. Furthermore, its capacity will be a (proper) multiple of the symmetric insider firms’ capacity. 
Thus, the merged firm’s capacity reads       , where     ,      {       }, for 1 indicates the 
merged and largest firm. Outsiders are left with the existing symmetric capacities        for 
  {         } . Any rationing follows the efficient rule, absent income effects. If firms 
charge the same price, demand distributes proportionally to its capacity. Homogeneous good 
production proceeds at the same constant, null, marginal and average cost, up to capacity for all 
firms. Demand function is assumed linear            if         ⁄  , zero otherwise. Firms’ 
sales can be written as min {       } and min {      } for the merged and each small symmetric 
firm, respectively. It is important to note that Davidson and Deneckere focus on symmetric 
equilibria, i.e. smaller firms play the same equilibrium strategy profiles. Existence of both the pure 
and mixed strategy equilibria is demonstrated, whilst uniqueness of the pair of distribution functions 
              is not, referring to previous work of the two authors.
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Depending on the relative values of  ,  and   the nature of the equilibrium would either be in pure 
or mixed strategies. Three different regions arise post-merger, conditionally on merger size and 
forthcoming demand vis-à-vis industry capacity. In the following theorem, Davidson and Deneckere 
define      * (  √      )+
 
  
, with          ⁄ , for    , to address the three 
equilibrium regions. 
Theorem 3.1 For each pair      ,        , the price-setting game with capacity 
constraints has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium: 
(i) If         ⁄  the equilibrium is in pure strategies, all firms charge      and earn 
zero profits, accordingly. 
(ii) If         ⁄ the equilibrium is pure strategies, all firms charge          ⁄  and 
profits for the merged and symmetric firms are, respectively,  1
*           ⁄  and 
 2
*          ⁄ . 
(iii) If       ⁄           ⁄  and        the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and:39 
    *   √      +   ⁄ ,    [        ]   ⁄ ; 
                                                          
38 For the choice of symmetric equilibria, see “Note that we restrict our search for equilibrium to symmetric cones, i.e. 
equilibria that treat outsiders symmetrically.” in Davidson and Deneckere (1984, p. 123, n. 10). For what concerns 
uniqueness, see “The argument leading to uniqueness is rather involved; the interested reader is referred to Davidson (1982) 
and Deneckere (1983)”, Davidson and Deneckere (1984, p. 129). 
39 When    this region is empty since then        for all   in the mixed strategy region. 
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(iv) If       ⁄         ⁄  and        the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and 
    [        ]
     ⁄ ,    [        ]   ⁄  
  1
*  [        ]   ⁄ ,   2
*  [        ]    ⁄ . 
Proof: The demonstration of a pure strategy equilibrium existence, i.e. points (i) and (ii) of Theorem 
3.1, is in fact the same as the proof of proposition 3.1. Thus, we refer to section 3.1 to show existence 
and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium in the specific case of the linear demand function. It is 
necessary to show the pair of mixed strategies (           ) is indeed a pair of equilibrium mixed 
strategies. The argument for uniqueness is, nonetheless, referred to Davidson (1982) and Deneckere 
(1983). Let  ̂  max{         ⁄ }  and    any equilibrium price. The following lemma restricts 
the set of equilibrium pure strategies. In the mixed strategy region,       ⁄           ⁄ , 
equilibrium profits  i
*must be constant, almost everywhere, across the support of equilibrium mixed 
strategies      . Almost everywhere          is continuous at  , follows 
 1
*   *∑   
     
       
         {          }      +  
 2
*   { ∑   
       
 
     
   
      
         {       } x [         
 {         }
      
 {             }]}  
Where    indicates the cost function of firm  . The following lemmas simplify the above expression 
for individual profits. 
Lemma 3.1 min {         }       [     ]                   
Proof: min {         }  min {                }  min
 ,
        
 
    -  
 . The last equality follows since         ⁄  in mixed strategies.  
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We have seen that if the largest firm charges a higher price then, smaller firms market all their 
production. The next lemma shows that when       , smaller firms do not sell anything if the 
larger firm charges a lower price. 
Lemma 3.2 If       * (  √      )+   ⁄      then    {             }  
 ,          ],             . 
Proof: min {             }  min {          } , where   is the one pointed in 
region (iii) of Theorem 3.1. the last expression is negative whenever           ⁄ , that is 
      . 
Similarly, we can prove that in region (iii) the large firm never sells at capacity, i.e.    {     
     }         ,          ],           . In region (iii) the expressions for the 
equilibrium profits become 1
*                    and  2
*            For all   in 
the support. In region (iii) the expressions for the equilibrium profits become 
 1
*   [∑   
      
     
       
         {          }]    (3.6) 
 2
*    [          ∑   
       
      
         
           {            }]  (3.7) 
The pair of equilibrium mixed strategies         (           ) constitute the unique 
equilibrium mixed strategies pair that solve both A.1’ and A.2’ and maintain expected profits 
constant throughout the support. It is straightforward to check that profits are decreasing off the 
support. Thus, all equilibrium conditions are satisfied. Q.E.D. 
The two pure strategy regions and the mixed strategy one can be described as follows, 
i. In terms of general oligopoly the first region is defined by          . A pure strategy 
equilibrium à la Bertrand arises in this first region. More precisely, this is a symmetric 
equilibrium, in which all firms set a price equal to the null marginal cost and make zero net 
profits. Generally, asymmetric strategies perhaps exist in which firms charge a positive price 
though selling null quantity. Anyhow, profits for each firm are null. 
ii. The second region is defined by the general oligopoly conditions        and    
    [     ]        , or         ⁄ . The two conditions state that firms sell all their 
production at market clearing price for aggregate capacity, and that such a price represents 
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. 
40 
 
In both regions in which the pure strategy equilibrium exists, the largest firm’s capacity must be 
necessarily small enough with respect to industry capacity, i.e.    ⁄      ⁄  or    ⁄    ⁄  
 , respectively in region (i) and (ii). 
iii. The third is the mixed strategies region, where       ⁄         ⁄ , if and only if 
   ⁄  |    ⁄ | . Davidson and Deneckere present two distinct areas (iii) and (iv) 
according to the size of the largest firm in the post merger      -oligopoly. In Davidson 
and Deneckere (1984) region (iii) is the one in which         , whilst in region (iv) 
demand and capacity are related by the inequality         . 
Notably, point 8 of Proposition 2 states that firm 2’s expected profits are   
      . Since smaller 
firms have all the same capacity as firm 2, then they all earn the same profits. This finding elucidates 
on the generality of Davidson and Deneckere’s (1984) results, whose profit characterization is not in 
any way limited, by the restriction to symmetric equilibria. Davidson and Deneckere (1984) model 
characterizes mixed strategies equilibrium in the case of a peculiar oligopoly setting, in which   
symmetric firms merge to create a bigger firm, whose size is a proper multiple of the symmetric 
oligopolists’ one. Davidson and Deneckere (1984) just inspect symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria 
that arise as the symmetric firms play the same mixed strategy. This constitutes the unique, 
symmetric equilibrium with the features exposed in the previous paragraph. Besides a symmetric 
equilibrium, De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b) further investigated whether asymmetric equilibria 
may exist with firms playing different equilibrium strategies in symmetric oligopolies. Furthermore, 
investigation involved whether asymmetric equilibria bear different properties than symmetric ones, 
i.e. equilibrium profits may be different according to the different equilibria. In De Francesco and 
Salvadori (2010b) is presented a finer partition of the mixed strategies region to investigate 
asymmetric equilibria. Davidson and Deneckere (1984) mixed strategy region is divided into two sub 
regions, according to merged firm dimension with respect to industry capacity. The two sub regions 
differ according to the dimension of the merged and largest firm. In terms of price the two sub 
regions can be addressed as either         , or         . In De Francesco and Salvadori 
(2010b) we find them characterized as 
A.         ; 
B.         . 
In sub region A it holds     ̿  
 
  
0  √      1
*1. Conditions on largest firm’s capacity 
constrain smal l  symmetric firms to set a lower price than the merged firm in order to sell a 
positive quantity. In [     ] the largest firm can meet all forthcoming demand, consequently small 
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firms’ expected profits will be   
        (       )         . Since    
           , 
then equilibrium mixed strategy for firm 1 will be 
      
    
 
                                     (3.8) 
The equation   
            in the unknowns           represents a degree of freedom in the 
system of equilibrium equations, leaving indeterminate the small firms’ strategy profiles. Assuming 
symmetry among small firms’ strategies, largest firm’s profit function can be written as 
  
  ∑ (    ) 
   
     
     (    )
 
[             ]  
       *∑ (    )
   
     
     (    )
 
+           
                 
And therefore 
   
        
 
       
                       (3.9) 
If small firms do not necessarily behave symmetrically then, analogously, firm one’s equilibrium 
profits will be written as 
  
          ∑   
 
                      (3.10) 
This equation constitutes a further constraint on   , besides the constraints of mixed strategies 
properties, i.e. a mixed strategy is continuous, nonnegative and non decreasing in [     ].
40
 Thus, 
in sub region 3A Davidson and Deneckere (1984) find the conditions for the unique symmetric 
equilibrium with the characteristics defined in Theorem 3.1.In sub region 3.B Davidson and 
Deneckere (1984) only determine the two extrema of the support and equilibrium profits. The 
existence of equilibrium mixed strategies       and             for            is not yet 
shown. Though a complete proof cannot be found, in De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b) a finer 
partition of the second sub region is presented. Furthermore, De Francesco and Salvadori reckon that 
whenever an asymmetric solution does not exist, then the symmetric one certainly exists. On the 
contrary, if an asymmetric solution exists, then a symmetric solution does not necessarily exist. Sub 
region iii.B can be split among Ba, Bb and Bc. Such areas are characterized by 
a.          if and only if     ⁄    ⁄ . 
                                                          
40 That is to say,           it is true      for at least some firm   , and necessarily         , and        
      . 
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b.                       if and only if    ⁄           ⁄    ⁄ . 
c.                 if and only if    ⁄       . 
Proposition 3.4 allows us to find a unique equilibrium in area c of the sub region iii.B in the interval 
[     ], where 
      
 
  
*
       
        
+
 
   
and               *
        
        
+
 
   
.                                   (3.11) 
The only difference between areas iii.Ba and iii.Bb is the presence of the interval [        ] in the 
first area but not in the second. In such interval the large firm is capable to satisfy the forthcoming 
demand, then the small firms can sell a positive quantity only undercutting the large one. Therefore, 
equation (3.8) holds only in the interval [        ]. Moreover, in the interval          ] exists a 
symmetric equilibrium in which (3.8) holds. As well as in the interval          ] a continuum of 
asymmetric equilibria exists, in which       satisfy (3.9).
41
 In sub regions iii.A and  iii.Ba there 
exists a continuum of equilibria. Nonetheless, De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b) show that 
equilibrium profits are unique regardless uniqueness of equilibrium mixed strategy.  
4. Horizontal Mergers Theoretical Analysis in Symmetric 
Triopolies à la Bertrand-Edgeworth 
In this chapter we investigate horizontal mergers between two symmetrically capacity-constrained 
price setting firms in a symmetric three-firm market. Horizontal mergers have received great 
attention in the last decades since Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), noticed curiously that the 
effects of horizontal combinations among quantity-setting sellers of a homogeneous good might not 
be those intuitively awaited. In fact, in a Cournot-Nash industry horizontal mergers can affect 
equilibrium increasing industry profit, while decreasing the profitability of merging firms below the 
sum of their pre-merger profits. 
The model considers symmetric oligopolists facing linear demand and constant, identical marginal 
and average cost. Following these assumptions the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. every firm produces 
the same output amount and earns the same profit. To recall the Salant et al. (1983) results, assume 
that the market is made of   firms each earning     . If two firms merge, then higher concentration 
leads to higher profits per firm as well as industry-wide. That is,              and       
           . Although in Salant et al. (1983) it is also true that             , i.e. the 
                                                          
41       must also be continuous, non negative and right increasing. Such constraints ensure continuity of       in      , 
since                                  . 
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survival organization’s profits is lower than the value of its constituents’ profits pre-merger. In the 
new equilibrium each firm produces       ⁄  of the total market production, each firm shares 
equally the output restriction due to the reduced number of active players in the market. The peculiar 
result obtains because the merged firm cannot be distinguished from the nonmerged firm as it is itself 
a symmetric player in the oligopoly. At the same time, unprofitable mergers for the merging parties 
demonstrate profitable for the nonmerged firms. The horizontal merger allows the merging firms to 
internalize the premerger rivalry, driving the merged entity to reduce output, increasing market price, 
to the sole benefit of outsiders. As a result, the takeover generates a positive external effect on the 
other firms. As a response to the merger, the other firms increase output, at expense of the merging 
firms’ profit.42 
However, a horizontal merger is argued to gain market power to the merged firm since allegedly, a 
larger firm can easily twist the terms of trade to its advantage, securing a higher profit than if each 
merging party acted independently. Further research examined the problem of characterization of 
profitable mergers, for instance Baik (1995) studies horizontal mergers in a homogeneous product 
market, introducing sunk capacity costs in the maximization problem of price setting firms. Unlike 
much of the previous literature, Baik (1995) finds that horizontal mergers always harm outsiders, and 
do not reduce joint profits of insiders, for certain values of the fixed costs schedule. Moreover, 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that the Salant et al. (1983) result is reversed for pricing 
competition. The reason is that a merger causes the participants collectively to behave less 
aggressively; behavior that benefits price-setters, but not quantity-setters. Perry and Porter (1985) and 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) examine mergers in the presence of increasing marginal costs, i.e. when 
firms own some industry-specific capital. Introducing decreasing returns to scale technology can be 
considered as well an example of capacity constraint. When firms engage in price competition with 
capacity constraints horizontal merger analysis describes quite satisfactorily the incentives to merge 
and the unilateral effects of the takeover. This chapter provides a theoretical analysis of static 
horizontal mergers among three equally capacity-constrained sellers of a homogeneous good that 
engage in price competition. It presents a taxonomy of horizontal takeover’s effects depending on the 
region of capacity in which the equilibrium exists. The results of this examination can be generalized 
quite intuitively to the more general symmetric oligopoly analysis of the following chapter.
 
 
                                                          
42 The Salant et al. (1983) peculiar result and the difficulties in providing a satisfactory model of horizontal mergers 
consistent with the profitability of mergers has raised the so-called “merger paradox”. Pepall, Richards, and Norman (1999) 
define the merger paradox as: “What may be surprising to you is that it is, in fact, quite difficult to construct a simple 
economic model in which there are sizable profitability gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a 
merger to monopoly. This difficulty is what we call the merger paradox.” 
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Section 1 lists the assumptions and provides the equilibrium characteristics, both in pure and mixed 
strategies, in the reference symmetric triopoly model. Section 2 investigates the effects of horizontal 
mergers in a model in which firms’ capacities allow pure strategy equilibria à la Bertrand pre-merger. 
Both pure and mixed strategy equilibrium configurations are investigated post-merger. Section 3 
investigates the effects of horizontal mergers in a pre-merger pure strategy equilibrium in which 
firms charge the aggregate capacity-clearing price. Pure and mixed strategy equilibrium 
configurations are investigated post-merger. The concluding section investigates the effects of 
horizontal mergers if a mixed strategy equilibrium exists pre-merger. 
4.1. Preliminaries 
Suppose three identical firms     {     } compete in the market and no entry or exit is allowed in 
the model. Equally-sized oligopolists produce a homogeneous good under constant, and null, 
marginal and average cost up to capacity. Neither installation costs of the existing capacity nor fixed 
costs are considered in this analysis. Firms name their price simultaneously and non-cooperatively. 
We assume all firms owns the same capacity and is constrained at       for     , and we define 
total capacity as   ∑      
 
 . Consumers preferences determine the demand function       , 
where   is market demanded quantity and   market price. Market demand is positive for       ̃ , 
where if    ̃ , then       . Furthermore, demand function is assumed continuous, strictly 
decreasing and such that       is strictly concave in     ̃ . For some propositions demand function 
is assumed concave in     ̃ . Conversely, the inverse demand function is defined for the decreasing 
part of the demand function such as              , in   (      ). Any rationing of the 
forthcoming demand by the capacity-constrained firms follows the efficient rule whose 
characteristics we refer to the first section of the previous chapter. According to the assumptions on 
individual and industry capacity, the simultaneous move game has a unique equilibrium either in 
pure or mixed strategies. 
Pure strategy equilibria à la Bertrand, in which firms charge marginal cost price, arise if    
         . In every Nash equilibrium at least two firms set marginal cost pricing, while the rival 
charges whatever price not lower than marginal cost. Whenever any two firms price at marginal cost, 
the other competitor will be indifferent on charging any other price at least equal to the null marginal 
cost, since it would still earn zero profits. At the same time, each of the   firms charging marginal 
cost price, has no incentive to name a different price, neither higher nor lower. This is not necessarily 
the only case in which Bertrand equilibria arise in capacity-constrained price competition. Recalling 
previous chapter’s results, a pure strategy equilibrium exists when firms are individually capacity-
constrained if and only if 
  max {           [     ]    }       (4.1) 
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Inequality (4.3) states that for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist a symmetric player must be 
sufficiently small-sized with respect to industry capacity. Let    indicate the competitive equilibrium 
price. If         then the triple           represents the unique pure strategy equilibrium; if 
       and      [     ]     then pure strategy equilibrium is the triple  
           
    . Thus, condition      [     ]     identifies the region of the            capacity space in 
which each firm’s capacity is not greater than its best-response quantity when the rivals produce at 
full capacity.
43
 Whenever a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist it might well be the case that 
mixed strategy equilibria do. Mixed strategy equilibria exist if 
     ⁄          [     ]               (4.2) 
where  ̃             [     ]       . Inequality (4.4) identifies the region in which a mixed 
strategy equilibrium exists if       . The capacity threshold above which firms are allowed to 
randomize over their price offers is not explicitly defined; as   appears on the left hand side as well 
as the right hand side of inequality (4.4). In the following proposition we formalize the result for the 
capacity threshold  ̃ as follows 
Proposition 4.1 There exist a unique value of capacity  ̃  such that a mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists if    ̃ . 
Proof: We shall recall the Cournot-Nash best response function    
 
   
         for       and 
     , each    .
44
 The first-order conditions    (   ∑       )    for firm   can be written as 
 (   ∑       )     
 (   ∑       )   . Rearranging      (   ∑       )  
 (   ∑       )⁄ , 
     (   ∑       ) 
 (   ∑       ) . The relation between         and industry capacity 
     ∑           is obtained differentiating both sides in total capacity. Differentiation yields 
     ⁄    
 (   ∑       ) 
 (   ∑       )  [  (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       ) 
 (   
∑       )] . And given the assumptions on concavity of demand function,      ⁄    
 (   
∑       )[ 
 (   ∑       )   (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )]   . The shape of the relation is 
not yet defined as it depends upon the shape of demand function. Thus, the capacity threshold  ̃  is 
the value that identifies in the      -space the intersection between the negatively sloped function 
                                                          
43 The region is namely the region bounded above by the lower envelope of the Cournot best-response functions. Note that 
the assumptions on capacity do not guarantee the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium. Uniqueness would be assured if 
                in (      ), see Deneckere and Kovenock (1992). 
44 The best-response function written in terms of quantity competition is equivalent to the one in terms of price and residual 
demand   , [ [ (     ∑      )]   ⁄ ]      . 
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 ̃       and the positively sloped ray through the origin     ⁄ .45  Hence, a mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists if    ̃ that is true if    ̃ .         Q.E.D. 
In the mixed strategy region an equilibrium always exists satisfying the sufficient conditions for 
existence of Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). We follow Vives (1986) to characterize 
mixed strategy equilibrium profiles for the symmetric triopoly. The features of the equilibrium 
distributions are the ones described in the second section of the previous chapter. The definitions of 
   and   , the infimum and supremum of      (     ) , the support of equilibrium mixed 
strategies, follow accordingly. Thus, the mixed strategies region can be addressed as         . 
Recall,    argmax             and    max { ̅  ̿} ; we let  ̅    
  ⁄  and  ̿  as the lower 
solution of the equation in  :   
*        (  
*  reads largest firm’s profits, in this case any 
symmetric competitor pre-merger). Equilibrium mixed strategies of all firms are assumed symmetric, 
i.e. all firms adopt the same equilibrium strategy,        for      obtained in Vives (1986). Pre-
merger equilibrium mixed strategy for the three-firm industry is        √
       
 (      )
          . 
4.2. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in Symmetric Triopoly: Premerger Pure 
Strategy Equilibrium à la Bertrand 
The proposed merger may involve any of the three symmetric firms, though we suppose 1 and 2 as 
merging firms and the third as unchanged outsider (post merger firm B). This merger leads to a 
duopoly in which the merged firm (post merger firm A) owns twice the capacity of its equally sized 
constituents.
46
 Assume the pre-merger equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium in which firms 
charge a null competitive price and earn zero profits accordingly. Horizontal mergers might either 
leave firms play pure strategy null equilibrium price or create a larger market player whose size 
allows to quote a higher price on the market than the competitive one, i.e. the equilibrium turns to 
mixed strategies. 
                                                          
45  The existence of an intersection draws on the fact that      ⁄    
 (   ∑       )[ 
 (   ∑       )   (   
∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )]    can be rewritten and manipulated to obtain 
     ⁄   [   (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )  
 (   ∑       )⁄ ]   . In order for the latter inequality to hold It 
must be,    (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )  
 (   ∑       )⁄   and consequently the fact that 
 (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )  
 (   ∑       )⁄     implies the slope of the function  ̃      is finite. 
46 Merging firms are assumed throughout the dissertation to quote the same price with probability one. Alternative to the 
post merger profit-maximization approach is to assume that a merger allows the new firm to use strategies that were not 
available pre-merger, see Creane and Davidson (2004) and Huck, Konrad and Müller (2004). 
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If        in every Nash equilibrium at least two firms set marginal cost pricing, while the rival 
charges any price not lower than marginal cost. The uniqueness argument is straightforward and 
referred to the previous chapter. In this capacity region, firms are individually so big to supply the 
whole forthcoming demand at marginal cost, i.e. equilibrium is the one à la Bertrand. If        
holds, then necessarily         and any merger has no real effect. This result stems from the fact 
that the merged firm will supply all forthcoming demand, as well as the outsider, at the lowest market 
price, i.e. marginal cost; this position constitutes the unique equilibrium both pre and post merger. 
The unique post-merger equilibrium profits are the null profits (the same as pre-merger). 
Whenever individual firms’ capacity is not big enough to supply all forthcoming demand at marginal 
cost, then the horizontal merger might create a duopoly in which size asymmetries between the two 
players create an incentive to quote a higher price than marginal cost. If        , equivalently 
       ⁄  then the outsider is capacity constrained while the merged firm is big enough to supply 
the forthcoming demand at marginal cost. This allows for different pricing incentives of the 
duopolists. That is, if           then post merger equilibrium is in mixed strategies. In mixed 
strategies, duopolists mix their price offers in the post merger price interval         . The extrema of 
the support of the mixed strategies are defined as in the previous chapter.
47
 Given the assumptions on 
firms’ dimensions, we can write    argmax            and    is the lower solution to 
max                 . Equilibrium payoffs of the game are    
*          and   
*     , 
respectively for the merged firm and outsider. Merged firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy    will be 
continuous and increasing over       ], due to concavity of profit function. Outsider’s    will be 
continuous and increasing over       ), since it has an incentive to undercut the rival, it will never 
reach the supremum. Since the merged firm charges the supremum of equilibrium supports with 
positive probability then its mixed strategy    everywhere dominates    over        . This 
acknowledged property of duopoly points to the different pricing incentives of the two firms: the 
smallest firm undercuts price with higher probability given the larger size of the rival.  
Proposition 4.2 If      ⁄        , post merger equilibrium is in mixed strategies where 
the range of equilibrium prices is strictly greater than the null pre-merger price. Thus, the merger is 
profitable for the merging parties and for the outsider. 
Proof: Horizontal merger is profitable for the outsider if   
*       , given null pre-merger profits 
any horizontal merger that allows the outsider to play a mixed strategy is profitable. Analogously, 
merged firm’s profits   
*            and horizontal mergers are profitable for insiders.    Q.E.D. 
                                                          
47 For further formalization see Theorem 1, point (a) in De Francesco and Salvadori (2013b), where the definition of the 
mixed strategies support extrema and the firms’ equilibrium profits can be found. 
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Although it is immediate to notice that the horizontal merger leads to a price increase from the null 
competitive equilibrium price pre-merger, we are left defining the equilibrium mixed strategies of the 
two firms post-merger. We shall consider as equilibrium mixed strategies those probability 
distributions that maximize expected profits at each price level      when the rival plays the 
equilibrium mixed strategy. The expected profits of any firm     when it names with certainty any 
price     , whist the rival     plays the equilibrium mixed strategy can be written as 
    (    )    min{max{         }   }     min{       }(    ), a.e. in    (4.3) 
Equilibrium profits and mixed strategy equilibrium profiles for an asymmetric duopoly are the ones 
found in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). The equilibrium mixed strategies are found in the specific 
case in which the largest firm doubles the dimension of the smaller firm considering that profits shall 
be maximized and constant along the mixed strategies support. Given the assumption on capacity 
        and the expected equilibrium profits for the merged firm and the outsider shall be 
  
*          and   
*     , respectively. We obtain the outsider mixed strategy from the 
expression of merged firm’s profits    [             ]   ⁄ . Since        , the outsider 
can only sell a positive quantity undercutting the larger one, that is      min{      }      . 
The merged firm’s equilibrium strategy yields           ⁄ . 
We have shown in this first section that horizontal mergers among capacity unconstrained firms have 
no real effect on both firms and consumers. Whenever the single capacity of market rivals is so high 
to satisfy the whole forthcoming demand, the equilibrium recreates the standard Bertrand result both 
pre and post-merger. If firms are not individually so large  but the combined capacity of two firms is 
sufficient to supply all forthcoming demand at null marginal cost, then an incentive to set a higher 
price than the competitive one arises. Horizontal mergers combine the capacity of any two of the 
three competitors to form a larger firm capable to fulfill market demand at marginal cost. Thus, 
horizontal takeovers allow competing firms to play mixed strategies in the post-merger duopoly, 
quoting a higher price than the competitive one raising profits for the duopolists.  
4.3. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in Symmetric Triopoly: Premerger Positive 
Price Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
The proposed merger may involve any of the three symmetric firms, though we suppose 1 and 2 as 
merging firms and the third as unchanged outsider (post merger firm A). This merger leads to a 
duopoly in which the merged firm (post merger firm B) owns twice the capacity of its equally sized 
constituents. Assume pre-merger equilibrium is in pure strategies, i.e.    ̃  where  ̃  
     [     ]       and  ̃
            
  (    ̃) identifies the value of the threshold above 
which mixed strategies are played following the analysis in the preliminary section 4.1. Thus, pre-
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merger equilibrium price is the positive competitive price            and every symmetric firm 
sells its full capacity, earning equilibrium profits   
*          for   {     }. A horizontal merger 
might either leave firms play pure strategies or create a larger market player whose size allows to 
quote a higher price on the market than the competitive one, i.e. equilibrium turns to mixed 
strategies. Since horizontal merging creates a larger firm, whose size doubles the capacity of the two 
participating firms, the threshold for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist changes accordingly. 
Inequality (4.4) must hold in this area of capacities for a pure strategy equilibrium pre-merger to 
exist. Inequality (4.4) identifies the region in which a mixed strategy equilibrium exists if       . 
The capacity threshold above which firms are allowed to randomize over their price offers is not 
explicitly defined; as   appears on the left hand side as well as the right hand side of inequality (4.4). 
In the following proposition we formalize the result for the post-merger capacity threshold  ̃   as 
follows 
Proposition 4.3 There exist a unique value of capacity  ̃   such that a pure strategy 
equilibrium exists if    ̃  , that is true if    ̃  ⁄ . 
Proof: We shall recall the Cournot-Nash best response function    
 
   
         for       and 
     , each    .
48
 Taking the first-order conditions and rearranging similarly to what has been 
done in section  4.2 we obtain      (   ∑       ) 
 (   ∑       ) . The relation between 
        and industry capacity      ∑           is obtained differentiating both sides in total 
capacity. Differentiation and the assumptions on concavity of demand function yield      ⁄  
   (   ∑       )[ 
 (   ∑       )   (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )]   . The shape of the 
relation is not yet defined as it depends upon the shape of demand function. Thus, the capacity 
threshold  ̃   is the value that identifies in the      -space the intersection between the negatively 
sloped function  ̃      and the positively sloped ray through the origin     ⁄  .49 In terms of 
total capacity  ̃   is obtained as  ̃      ⁄    ̃   . Post-merger threshold must be lower than pre-
merger capacity threshold  ̃    ̃  . Thus, a pure strategy post-merger equilibrium is played if 
   ̃  ⁄ .     Q.E.D.  
If    ̃  ⁄  post-merger equilibrium is in pure strategies. No other equilibrium can be found since 
each firm hardly has incentive either to cut price below or to raise it above the competitive price 
                                                          
48 The best-response function written in terms of quantity competition is equivalent to the one in terms of price and residual 
demand   , [ [ (     ∑      )]   ⁄ ]      . 
49 The existence of an intersection cam be shown as in section  4.1. The slope of the function  ̃      is finite and it 
necessarily intersects the line     ⁄  .  
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     . It would not be an equilibrium charging a lower price, since the firm would not be able to 
produce any additional output to meet increased demand. Nor it is charging a higher price since it 
would reduce its own sales and profits. The equilibrium profits are   
*          for   {     }. 
That is, equilibrium post merger has the same characteristics as the pre-merger one: if    ̃  ⁄  
holds, the equilibrium post merger will be played in pure strategies and firms will charge the 
competitive price,           . Equilibrium profits for each firm will be   
*          and 
  
*        , for the merged and outsider firm, respectively. The merger does not alter equilibrium 
profits of competitors: neither for the insider firms, whose joint profits even the sum of insiders’ pre-
merger profits, since   
*             
*         ; nor for the outsider whose profits rest at 
the pre-merger level. Therefore, if a pure strategy equilibrium exists both pre and post merger, 
horizontal mergers do not have real effects on either firms or consumers. 
More theoretically attractive is the case in which horizontal mergers turn the pure strategy 
equilibrium pre-merger into a mixed strategy one. If  ̃     ̃  ⁄  then post merger equilibrium is 
in mixed strategies. In mixed strategies, duopolists mix their price offers in the post merger price 
interval        . The supremum of the post merger price range is determined by the largest firm, 
monopolizing residual demand as the smallest firm charges a lower price, i.e. 
   argmax           . Largest firm will earn profits   
              . The infimum is set 
by the larger firm perhaps undercutting the small one while earning profits   
 , Then,    
max { ̅  ̿}, where we define  ̅    
  ⁄  and  ̿ as the lower solution of equation   
       . In turn, 
    ̅  if          or     ̿ , otherwise. In turn,     ̅  if          or     ̿ , otherwise. 
Merged firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy    will be continuous and increasing over       ], due to 
concavity of profit function. Outsider’s equilibrium mixed strategy    is continuous and increasing 
over       ); since it has an incentive to undercut the rival    will never reach the supremum. Post-
merger equilibrium mixed strategies extrema must satisfy                 , since the 
merged firm will neither set    over outsider’s capacity-dumping price, to sell null output; nor set    
lower than the competitive price. Moreover, since largest firm charges the supremum of equilibrium 
supports with positive probability then its mixed strategy    everywhere dominates    over 
       . That is, the smaller firm sets a lower price than any price  , with higher probability than the 
larger competitor. This suggests that the smaller firm competes more aggressively than the large firm, 
charging a lower price than the rival, with higher probability. 
 It is straightforward to show that merger is profitable for the outsider firm if post-merger equilibrium 
mixed strategies are played. Premerger individual firm earns pure strategy equilibrium profits 
  
*        , whilst post merger outsider profits result   
*     . Since         , for a mixed 
strategy equilibrium to be played, then outsider firm earns higher profits post merger. Profitability 
analysis of horizontal merger for the merged firm is less straightforward as it depends on its size vis-
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à-vis market demand at   . If                    , then equilibrium post merger profits read 
  
      . Comparing post and pre-merger profits             , the merger is profitable for 
the merged firm. On the contrary, if                    , then merged firm’s profits are 
  
         , since      
      ⁄ . Merger impact is then non obvious and profitability for 
insiders needs further investigation. 
Proposition 4.4 If  ̃     ̃  ⁄ , post-merger equilibrium is in mixed strategies whose 
equilibrium price range is strictly higher than premerger price. Thus, merger is profitable for insiders. 
Proof: For the above reasoning, to show horizontal mergers profitability for insiders, it suffices to 
investigate the case in which         . Since            , if                , considered 
              , then                , then the merger is profitable. Merged firm’s 
expected profits are also equal to            . Optimal choice    for merged firm yields first 
order conditions            
       , that is          
         . The expression 
           is the first derivative of the concave function       in  , that is increasing only to 
the left of its maximum, i.e.     . This implies in turn,         and         .        Q.E.D. 
If capacities are small enough, i.e. every firm produces at most its Cournot-Nash best response 
quantity, then an equilibrium in pure strategies arises in which firms charge a positive price and 
produce at full capacity. In this capacity configuration, capacities represent a quantity commitment 
for firms therefore capacity constraints are binding. Horizontal mergers can relax such constraints 
creating a bigger market player whose capacity is sufficiently high to play a mixed strategy. In mixed 
strategies an incentive to charge a higher price than the competitive one arises and quantities are 
randomized over a range below their actual capacity. Thus, if a mixed equilibrium arises post merger, 
industry-wide price increases. Furthermore, when mixed strategies arise post merger, horizontal 
mergers are profitable for both outsiders and insiders. 
4.4. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in Symmetric Triopoly: Premerger Mixed 
Strategy Equilibrium 
The proposed merger may involve any of the three symmetric firms, though we suppose 1 and 2 as 
merging firms and the third as unchanged outsider (post-merger firm A). This merger leads to a 
duopoly in which the merged firm (post-merger firm B) owns twice the capacity of its equally sized 
constituents. A mixed strategy equilibrium premerger occurs whenever    ̃ . A mixed strategy 
equilibrium post-merger occurs if    ̃  ⁄ . Since    ̃   ̃  ⁄  then a mixed strategy equilibrium 
post-merger necessarily follows from a mixed strategy equilibrium pre-merger, in the assumptions of 
our model. Equilibrium mixed strategies before the takeover have the characteristics specified in the 
opening section. More specifically the supremum is defined as    argmax            , which 
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implies in turn          and         . This allows to state that the open set         is a 
subset of (           ). The same properties hold for equilibrium mixed strategies post merger, as 
firms randomize their strategy over the post-merger price range equilibrium mixed strategy support 
       . Post-merger mixed strategies are defined accordingly to what already showed in section 
4.2. Merged firm’s expected profits for any price      are  A
*             [      ]  
(       )   min{       }    [       ] ; and the outsider’s expected profits as 
  
   ,       max {         }       )       . To analyze horizontal merger profitability 
it is necessary to investigate the effect the horizontal merger exerts on the extrema of equilibrium 
mixed strategies support. Post-merger price range extrema result higher than the pre-merger ones that 
implies mergers are profitable for both duopolists. 
Proposition 4.5 If    ̃   ̃  ⁄  the supremum of the equilibrium mixed strategies’ support 
is lower than the post-merger one, i.e.      . 
Proof: Mixed strategies support suprema are    argmax            while 
   argmax            , respectively pre- and post-merger. To obtain the result we need 
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is true if and only if      , due to concavity of demand function.          Q.E.D. 
Showing the supremum of equilibrium mixed strategies post-merger is greater than the premerger 
one is not sufficient to conclude that merger is profitable for insiders. Premerger each triopolist earns 
profits   
         max   [       ]    {     }. In order to be profitable for insiders, the 
merged entity’s profits, i.e.   [       ], must be greater than merging firms’ joint profits pre-
merger, i.e.    [       ]      .  
Proposition 4.6 If    ̃   ̃  ⁄ , the merger is profitable for the merged firm. 
Proof: Notice that each firm’s profits increases as outsiders’ capacity decreases, i.e. 
   
       ∑           ⁄ . That is, if                      , it follows       . 
That is true    in both supports since in mixed strategies an incentive arises to charge a price higher 
than the competitive one, i.e.        . Therefore,                          . Since 
   solves optimization of firm’s profits, it implies in turn,                         
            . This leads to   
    
    
  for pre-merger    {   }. Q.E.D. 
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Hence, horizontal mergers when mixed strategy equilibria arise post-merger are profitable for insider 
firms, increasing their profits above premerger level. 
Proposition 4.7 If    ̃   ̃  ⁄ , then       and mergers are profitable for the outsider. 
Proof: Note that      
*  ⁄  and     A
* min{       }⁄  . Two cases can be considered, either 
         or         . In the first,      
  ⁄     , by Proposition 4.5 it is   
     
 . In the 
second,      
*      ⁄   A
*   ⁄  since         . Thus, in both cases       holds. Since 
postmerger outsider’s profits are   
     , then outsiders’ profits are higher than premerger. Q.E.D.  
Both Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.7 show a rightwards shift of equilibrium mixed strategies 
supports post-merger. Both extrema post-merger are greater than the corresponding pre-merger ones, 
since the supremum prior to the merger is necessarily to the left of      , i.e.         . 
However,    and    can individually be on either sides of      , in the assumptions of the model. 
Post-merger mixed strategies profiles need to be obtained and characterized in order to derive the 
effect of horizontal merger on price level. The characteristics of equilibrium mixed strategies profile 
(           )  depend on the relative positions of   ,   , and       within the interval 
(          ) . Nevertheless, (           )  lie at the right of the pre-merger mixed strategy 
equilibrium profile, shifting accordingly to the shift of the supports. To find the post merger 
equilibrium mixed strategies we shall consider the condition of optimality of profits in mixed 
strategies, i.e. equilibrium profits are maximized and constant for any price on the support. Firms’ 
profits characterization post-merger follows from Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) for the asymmetric 
duopoly. Three cases differ according to the relative position of the three prices   ,    and      . 
That is,         ,            , and         ; we shall study in turn. 
If             then         . In this sub region of equilibrium mixed strategies firms’ 
expected profits are   
           and   
      , for the merged firm and the outsider, 
respectively. Expected equilibrium profits for firm B can be written as  B
                   . 
And substituting for   
     , merged firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy will be       
       ⁄ . Outsider’s equilibrium mixed strategy is                
    ⁄  (      
       )   . 
If             then         . In this sub region of equilibrium mixed strategies firms’ 
expected profits are   
        and   
     , for the merged firm and the outsider, respectively. 
This sub region requires the specification of two smaller subsets as equilibrium mixed strategies 
change if prices are randomized to the left or to the right of      . As price ranges within 
[        ], then demand satisfies the inequality              . To obtain the equilibrium 
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mixed strategies we write profits as                                and    
                         . Thus, equilibrium mixed strategies pair is, 
              (       )⁄  and                (       )⁄ .   (4.4) 
Analogously, as price ranges within [        ], then                , meaning that in the 
relevant price range firm A can supply all forthcoming demand at relevant price  . Thus, equilibrium 
mixed strategy pair is, 
             ⁄  and       [        
 ]   ⁄  [          ]   ⁄ .             (4.5) 
The price ranges can be written as closed intervals since both        and       are continuous at 
     . To show this we shall take the left limit of the probability distribution functions (4.6), and the 
right limit of (4.7). 
For       it is, 
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Fig.4.1. Equilibrium Mixed Strategies Supports Pre and Post Merger 
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For       it is, 
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Finally, If             then,         . Each firm’s expected profits are   
        and 
  
     . Solving for equilibrium mixed strategies yields               (       )⁄  and 
               (       )⁄ . 
To show horizontal mergers unilateral effects, pre- and postmerger equilibrium mixed strategies have 
to be compared. Equilibrium mixed strategy in the pre-merger symmetric game is  √
       
 (      )
 . 
Proposition 4.8 In the mixed strategy region,    ̃   ̃  ⁄ , post merger price distributions 
            have strict first order stochastic dominance over pre-merger price distribution      . 
That is to say, pre-merger firms have strictly higher probability to sell below any particular price than 
either of the post merger firms does, except at   . Consequently, merger is profitable for both merger 
insiders and outsider. 
Proof (Sketch): To show unilateral effects we shall consider only price ranges in which the pre and 
post-merger distributions overlap. Following Kreps e Scheinkman (1983), outsider firm is smaller 
than the merged firm then      . First, consider the price configurations               
and         . The mixed strategy profile depends on the value of   . If        there is no 
overlap, as well as if          the relevant price   does not fall in the overlap. Thus, in both 
cases pre-merger mixed strategy   is stochastically dominated by post-merger distributions         
in the relevant price range. Consider the price configurations                     and 
                   . Pre and post merger equilibrium mixed strategies are   
√
       
 (       )
,            (       )⁄ , and             (       )⁄ , respectively. 
It is straightforward to see that     
    for any          , i.e. merged firm behaves less 
aggressively than any other pre-merger firm (undercutting price with lower probability). At the same 
time          
   , more precisely if     ⁄  then          
       , i.e. 
   is less than   at any price. If     ⁄  comparing pre and post merger strategies is not immediate 
and involves the comparison between the slopes of the distributions of    and  . It can be shown 
that the slope of    is everywhere greater than that of  , in the overlap. That is   , is everywhere 
smaller than   at any price level in the relevant price range. Second, consider the price 
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configurations              . The post merger mixed strategies are              ⁄  
and       [          ]   ⁄ . Also in this price range there is no overlap between the 
distributions of    and  ; thus,   is stochastically dominated by   . Third, consider the price 
configurations         . Post-merger mixed strategies are              ⁄  and       
(             )   ⁄ . No overlapping between the distributions produce the same results as the 
previous price configurations, i.e.    stochastically dominates .
50
 Q.E.D. 
If mixed strategy equilibria hold pre and post merger, then horizontal mergers reduce competition 
among oligopolists and favor unilateral price increase by the merged and outsider firms. Equilibrium 
mixed strategy support post merger shifts rightwards, while the probability for firms to price at any 
price   is lower than the probability to do the same pre-merger. Thus, price increases post merger. 
For the outsider firm the effect of the takeover is the same; note that the smaller firm is supposed to 
compete more aggressively undercutting with higher probability than the largest firm, due to its 
lower size. Nonetheless post merger the smallest firm increases its support’s infimum and undercuts 
the rival with lower probability than it did pre-merger, relaxing the terms of competition. 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
This basic triopoly model investigates merging as creating a new larger firm whose size determines 
the nature of equilibrium post-merger. If individual capacity is so big to supply all forthcoming 
demand at marginal cost,       , then it must be         and any merger has no real effect. 
The marginal cost pricing pure strategy equilibrium will be played by all the players both pre and 
post merger. If individual firms’ dimension do not allow to quote marginal cost as equilibrium price, 
      , the merger of two firms might be enough to satisfy demand at marginal cost (       ). 
If the latter is true, then horizontal mergers transform pure strategy equilibrium into a mixed strategy 
one. If single capacity satisfies the inequality             ⁄  then both the merged and the 
outsider firm play a mixed strategy, quoting a strictly positive price on the market. Thus, industry-
wide price increases and the horizontal merger allows merging firms to increase profits. Whenever 
   ̃  ⁄  firms’ capacity constraints are binding both pre- and postmerger and horizontal mergers do 
not alter the pure strategy equilibrium         . If individual size is not so small, i.e.  ̃    
 ̃  ⁄ , then post-merger equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Firms randomize over a price range whose 
lower bound is strictly greater than the unique pre-merger equilibrium price and earn higher profits 
thatn the competitive pre-merger ones. 
                                                          
50 The full proof, upheld by intuitive graphical analysis, is referred to Gang Li (2013). Besides the formal proof, we shall 
consider the qualitative effects of horizontal merging between two of the three rival firms. 
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The mixed strategy equilibrium pre-merger arises in the intermediate region of capacities, i.e.   
 ̃ . The post-merger equilibrium will necessarily be in mixed strategies and firms mix their price 
offers over a higher price range. Unilateral effects do not only account for a higher price post-merger, 
since the takeover affects post-merger price distributions as well. Post-merger merger firms undercut 
price with lower probability than pre-merger, loosening the terms of competition. With three 
symmetric price setters a merger to duopoly becomes profitable for insiders firms, if mixed strategy 
equilibrium prevails post-merger. Contrarily to the predictions of the Salant et al. (1983) result, 
whose symmetric treatment stems from the assumption of quantity competition, linear demand and 
constant, identical marginal and average cost, a merger to duopoly in a three-firm price-setting 
market is ultimately profitable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The Nature of Post-Merger Equilibrium as a Function of Capacity in the Symmetric Triopoly 
Model 
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5. Horizontal Mergers Theoretical Analysis in Symmetric 
Oligopolies à la Bertrand-Edgeworth 
In this chapter we extend the previous chapter triopolistic industry analysis to horizontal mergers in 
symmetric oligopoly. We characterize formally horizontal combinations in a symmetric oligopoly to 
present a taxonomy of the takeover effects depending on the region of capacity in which the 
equilibrium lies. The merged firm still constitutes as a larger firm whose size is a proper multiple of 
merging firms’ capacities. In the symmetric oligopoly model the study of horizontal mergers among 
  symmetrically capacity-constrained price setting firms differs from the analysis of triopoly 
according to the relative values of  ,  and  . The dimensional characteristics of the pre-merger 
competitors and the merged firm characterize the equilibrium mixed strategies differently from the 
previous’ chapter analysis. The relative characteristics of merged firm and the remainder of the 
industry allow writing different equilibrium profiles and a richer taxonomy of horizontal merger 
effects. 
Then, the chapter also investigates a more specific example of oligopoly with linear demand as it is 
characterized in Davidson and Deneckere (1984 and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010a). Assuming 
linear demand and efficient rationing, Davidson and Deneckere (1984) provide a full characterization 
of equilibria when capacities fall in the mixed strategies region, restricting attention to symmetric 
equilibria. De Francesco and Salvadori (2010a) deepen the earlier Davidson and Deneckere (1984) 
contribution and present a finer partition of the mixed strategy region. Davidson and Deneckere 
(1984) find that mergers are never disadvantageous in the static price game, profits increase in the 
size of the coalition of the merged and largest firm for all values of the size of the smallest firms 
(symmetric outsiders). Merged firm constitutes as an attempt to earn monopoly profits by the 
coalition, in this way it may successfully raise industry prices, benefiting outsiders that even keeping 
their price, sell more and earn higher profits. Thus, merger effects are the same as in the triopoly 
model. Mixed strategy equilibria allow firms to earn higher post-merger profits, by randomizing over 
a price range that is strictly greater than the pre-merger price. 
We will study and deepen the Davidson and Deneckere (1984) contribution to assess merger 
profitability and unilateral price effects in the same linear demand function oligopoly. The section 1 
lists the assumptions and provides the equilibrium characteristics, both in pure and mixed strategies 
for the general symmetric oligopoly. Section 2 investigates the effects of horizontal mergers in a 
model in which firms’ capacities allow pure strategy equilibria à la Bertrand pre-merger. Section 3 
investigates the effects of horizontal mergers in a pre-merger pure strategy equilibrium, in which 
firms charge the aggregate capacity-clearing price. Section 4 studies mergers in a linear demand 
oligopoly à la Davidson and Deneckere (1984).  
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5.1. Preliminaries (in oligopoly) 
Suppose   identical firms     {     } with    , compete in the market and no entry or exit is 
allowed in the model. Equally sized oligopolists produce a homogeneous good under constant, and 
null, marginal and average cost up to capacity. Neither installation costs of the existing capacity nor 
fixed costs are considered in this analysis. Firms name their price simultaneously and non-
cooperatively. We assume the symmetric capacity case, i.e.               , all firms 
own the same capacity and we define total capacity as   ∑      
 
 . Consumers preferences 
determine the demand function       , where   is market demanded quantity and   market price. 
Market demand is positive for       ̃ , where if    ̃, then       . Furthermore, demand 
function is assumed continuous, strictly decreasing and such that       is strictly concave for 
      ̃ . For some propositions demand function can be assumed concave in     ̃ . Conversely, 
the inverse demand function is defined for the decreasing part of the demand function such as 
             , in   (      ). Any rationing of the forthcoming demand by the capacity-
constrained firms follows the efficient rule, whose characteristics we refer to the third chapter. 
According to the assumptions on individual and industry capacity, the simultaneous move game has 
an equilibrium either in pure or mixed strategies. Any pure strategy equilibrium can be found as a 
straightforward generalization of the result in duopoly. Whenever firms have a sizeable dimension, 
i.e.            , in every Nash equilibrium at least two firms set marginal cost pricing, while 
the rivals charge whatever price not lower than marginal cost. Whenever two firms price at marginal 
cost, each firm   of the     firms left will be indifferent on charging any other price at least equal 
to  , since it would still earn null profits. At the same time, each of the   firms pricing at marginal 
cost, has no incentive to price differently. Pricing higher, as well as pricing lower, would gain 
respectively either null or negative profits to the firm, and do not represent equilibrium positions. 
Uniqueness argument follows previous chapter’s analysis. Besides the previous extreme assumption 
on single firms’ size that resembles Bertrand’s analysis, in oligopoly a pure strategy equilibrium at 
which firms charge null marginal cost might arise if the combined capacity of all the firms but the 
largest one can supply the forthcoming demand at marginal cost. In the symmetric player game it 
suffices that the combined capacity of all firms but one to supply forthcoming demand at marginal 
cost for a pure strategy equilibrium à la Bertrand to arise. Thus, the  -tuple         is a pure 
strategy equilibrium if            . 
A unique positive pure strategy equilibrium arises for other capacity configurations, as well. If 
      , firms are in fact capacity constrained. If firms’ capacity equals at most their best response 
function, i.e.         [     ]
       
 then a pure strategy equilibrium arises. Firms are 
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sufficiently small and charge the price that clears aggregate capacity (competitive price      ). The 
conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium can be summarized as follows 
  max ,                  [     ]
       
-      (5.1) 
Inequality (5.1) states that any capacity-constrained symmetric competitor (pre-merger) must be 
sufficiently small with respect to industry capacity, in order for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist in 
capacity-constrained oligopoly. Whenever inequality (5.1) is violated, a pure strategy equilibrium 
does not exist while mixed strategy equilibria do. That is to say that a mixed strategy equilibrium 
exists when              if capacity satisfies the inequality 
        [     ]
       
         (5.2) 
where  ̂             [     ]
       
. The capacity threshold above which firms are allowed to 
randomize over their price offers is not explicitly defined; as   appears on the left hand side as well 
as the right hand side of inequality (5.2). In the following proposition we formalize the result for the 
capacity threshold  ̂  as follows 
Proposition 5.1 There exists a unique value of capacity  ̂  such that a mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists if    ̂ . 
Proof: We shall recall the Cournot-Nash best response function, take the first-order conditions, and 
obtain the relation between         and industry capacity      ∑           differentiating 
both sides in total capacity, analogously to Proposition 4.1. Differentiation, given the assumptions on 
concavity of demand function, yields      ⁄    
 (   ∑       )[ 
 (   ∑       )  
 (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )]   . The shape of the relation depends upon the shape of 
demand function. The capacity threshold  ̂  is the value that identifies in the      -space the 
intersection between the negatively sloped function  ̂       and the positively sloped ray through 
the origin     ⁄ . An intersection exists since      ⁄   [       
          ⁄ ]   . Thus, 
                 ⁄   , and                ⁄    . This implies the slope of  ̂       is 
finite. Hence, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists if    ̂ that is true if and only if    ̂ . Q.E.D. 
In the mixed strategy region an equilibrium always exists satisfying the sufficient conditions for 
existence of Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a). We follow Vives (1986) to characterize 
mixed strategy equilibrium profiles for the symmetric oligopoly. We let the mixed strategy 
equilibrium profile follow the specification of the previous chapter. The definitions of    and   , 
the infimum and supremum of      (     ), the support of equilibrium mixed strategies, follow 
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accordingly. Hence, inequality (5.2.) can be substituted with         to address the mixed 
strategy region. Indeed, if          then             ; whereas, if 
        [     ]
       
 then              . Finally, note that in the region where 
inequalities (5.2) hold the extrema of equilibrium mixed strategies supports are defined    
argmax                ,      
  ⁄ , where  1
* refers to the profits of the largest firm (in this 
case any symmetric competitor pre-merger). Equilibrium mixed strategies of all firms are assumed 
symmetric, i.e. all firms adopt the same equilibrium strategy,        for     . This assumption 
allows us to write firm   pre-merger equilibrium mixed strategy        √
       
 (      )
   
        
  , as in Vives (1986).  
5.2. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in Symmetric Oligopoly: Premerger Pure 
Strategy Equilibrium à la Bertrand 
The investigated merger would take place among  symmetric firms, leaving outside at least two 
firms, in order to consider a more general case than the previous triopoly model where only one took 
the outsider role. Therefore, the proposed horizontal mergers would involve any     merging 
firms in a market of     firms. This merger leads to an oligopoly in which the merged firm (post-
merger firm A) owns -times the capacity of its equally sized constituents. Any symmetric firm is 
referred to as firm B in the post-merger setting. Assume the pre-merger equilibrium is a pure strategy 
equilibrium in which firms charge a null competitive price and earn zero profits accordingly. 
Horizontal mergers might either leave firms play the pure strategy null equilibrium price or create a 
larger market player whose size allows to quote a higher price on the market than the competitive 
one, i.e. the equilibrium turns to mixed strategies. Individual firms’ capacity may either be big 
enough to supply all forthcoming demand at marginal cost or not. If they are of considerable 
dimension a pure strategy equilibrium arises in which firms set the null marginal cost pricing. When 
single firms cannot supply all forthcoming demand, horizontal mergers might either create a coalition 
whose size still supplies the whole forthcoming demand at marginal cost; or create an oligopoly in 
which size asymmetries between the merged firm and the other symmetric players create an incentive 
to quote a higher price than marginal cost. Postmerger pure strategy (null) marginal cost price 
equilibrium arises if          , for       . Since       then postmerger pure strategy 
equilibrium arises if            , i.e. if            ⁄ . That is, pure strategy equilibrium 
arises both pre- and postmerger if            ⁄           ⁄ , since the merger involves 
more than two firms. For this region of capacity horizontal mergers do not affect neither industry-
wide price nor single firms’ profits since all competitors charge marginal cost price and earn zero 
profits. 
62 
 
If individual firms’ capacity is not big enough to supply all forthcoming demand at marginal cost, 
then the horizontal merger might create an oligopoly in which size asymmetries between the merged 
firm and the remainder of the industry create an incentive to quote a higher price than marginal cost. 
A pure strategy post-merger equilibrium in which firms charge the null marginal cost fails to exist if 
           . Thus, the post-merger size configuration for the individual capacity to allow for 
mixed strategies follows          ⁄             ⁄ . This allows for different pricing 
incentives of the oligopolists. In mixed strategies, oligopolists mix their price offers in the post 
merger price interval        . Given this capacity configuration, contrarily to the three-firm market 
in which the merged firm could supply all the forthcoming demand in post-merger mixed strategies, 
the m-firm merger creates a sizeable market player whose dimension still constraints its profits. The 
extrema of the support of the mixed strategies are defined as in the third chapter. Given the 
assumptions on firms’ dimensions, we can write    argmax                 and    
max { ̅  ̿}, where we define  ̅    
  ⁄  and  ̿ the lower solution of the equation max         
        . In turn,     ̅  if          or     ̿ , otherwise. Outsiders’ equilibrium profits 
reads   
*     . Merged firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy    will be continuous and increasing 
over       ] , due to concavity of profit function, whilst outsider’s    will be continuous and 
increasing over        . Since the merged firm charges the supremum of equilibrium supports with 
positive probability then its mixed strategy    everywhere dominates    over        . This 
acknowledged property of duopoly points to the different pricing incentives of the differently sized 
oligopolists: the smallest firms charge a lower price with higher probability given the large size of the 
rival. 
Proposition 5.2 If          ⁄             ⁄ , post merger equilibrium is in mixed 
strategies where firms charge a strictly positive price within the mixed strategies support. Thus, the 
merger is profitable for the merging parties and the outsiders. 
Proof: Horizontal merger is profitable for any outsider if   
*       , given null pre-merger 
profits any horizontal merger that allows the outsider to play a mixed strategy is profitable. 
Analogously, merged firm’s profits either   
*          or   
*       are both strictly positive 
and horizontal mergers are profitable for insiders. Q.E.D. 
Although it is immediate to notice that the horizontal merger leads to a price increase from the null 
competitive equilibrium price pre-merger, we are left defining the equilibrium mixed strategies of the 
two firms’ dimensions post-merger. Any outsider is assumed to play the same mixed strategy post-
merger. We shall consider as equilibrium mixed strategies those probability distributions that 
maximize expected profits at each price level      when the rival plays the equilibrium mixed 
strategy. Equilibrium profits for an asymmetric oligopoly are the ones found as a straightforward 
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generalization of Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) results in a duopoly. The equilibrium mixed 
strategies are found in the specific case in which the largest firm has a size equal to a proper multiple 
of smaller firms’ size. Profits shall be maximized and constant along the mixed strategies support. 
The characterization of dimensional characteristics in this oligopoly determines the different mixed 
strategy profiles. Given the premerger capacity configuration             that implies    
              and more specifically             . Thus,     (      )  holds. 
Mixed strategy profiles depend on the capacity of the merged firm, whether or not it can supply all 
forthcoming demand at   . Mixed strategy are sensitive to the different capacity setting. Conditional 
upon the merged firm’s dimension with respect to the remainder of the industry, the following 
inequalities hold: either                    or                   . If 
    ⁄  then the market is dimensionally characterized by the first chain of inequalities; by the 
second otherwise. Accordingly, we are allowed to write either  
I.        (      ), or 
II.  (      )       . 
We shall also consider the mixed strategies support upper bound   . Since    argmax         
        then             , that implies     (      ). Hence, in configuration (I) 
a)              (      ); 
b)              (      ); 
c)              (      ). 
In configuration (II) it holds        (      )       . 
If capacity configuration is the (I.a) one, i.e.             then               . In this 
sub region of equilibrium mixed strategies firms’ expected profits are   
        and   
     , 
for the merged firm and the outsider, respectively. This sub region requires the specification of two 
smaller sub sets as equilibrium mixed strategies change if prices are randomized to the left or to the 
right of      . As price ranges within [        ], then demand satisfies the inequality       
       . The symmetric outsider profits can be written taking in consideration that a symmetric 
outsider can undercut the merged firm, the other symmetric competitors, or both; or rather price 
higher than any other symmetric competitor and the merged firm. The expected profit formula 
follows from the previous chapter. Therefore, merged firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy       
 
 
√
        
 (       )
   
, as in De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b). The mixed strategy profile stems from 
the adherence of the mixed strategy region characteristics in sub region 3Bc with the one above. 
64 
 
Exploiting the equilibrium profits for the merged firm            min{max{       
      }   }  
      min{       }     
    The equilibrium mixed strategy for any 
symmetric outsider can be written as follows        √
        
         
   
, in [     ] . 
Analogously, as price ranges within [        ], then               , meaning that in 
the relevant price range firm A can supply all forthcoming demand at relevant price  . Thus, the 
small equally-sized firms can sell a positive output only undercutting the large one. That is, firms no 
longer set simultaneously their strategies. For firm B profits are  B
                
        . Accordingly,              ⁄ . The system      
         has a degree of 
freedom in the set of equilibrium mixed strategies of the outsider firms    . Therefore, small 
symmetric firms are not uniquely defined. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. symmetric firms 
play the same mixed strategy, any outsider’s equilibrium mixed strategy can be written as       
[        
 ]   ⁄  [          ]        ⁄ . Similarly to what already done for the reference 
triopoly case, price intervals are considered closed since both distributions are continuous at      . 
Taking the limit as it has been done in the previous chapter shows this. If capacity configuration is 
the (I.b) one, i.e.              (      ) that is in terms of demand         . In this 
sub region of equilibrium mixed strategies firms’ expected profits are   
           and   
  
    , for the merged firm and any outsider, respectively. Expected equilibrium profits for firm B can 
be written as  B
                        . Merged firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy profile 
is              ⁄ . Assuming a symmetric behavior for the small outsider firms, any symmetric 
firm’s equilibrium mixed strategy profile can be written       (             )        ⁄ . 
If capacity configuration is either the (I.c) or the (II) the same profile of strategies can be written, 
since in both subregions the inequality             holds. In terms of demand       
        . Each firm’s expected profits are   
       and any outsider’s   
     . Solving 
for equilibrium mixed strategies yields       
 
 
√
        
 (       )
   
 and        √
        
         
   
, in 
[     ] . the same distributions as in capacity configuration (I.a). 
We have shown in this first section that horizontal mergers among capacity unconstrained firms have 
no real effect on both firms and consumers. Whenever the single capacity of market rivals is so high 
to satisfy the whole forthcoming demand, the equilibrium recreates the standard Bertrand result both 
pre and post merger. If firms are not individually so large, but the collective capacity of all but one is 
enough to set price at marginal cost then mergers allow either to charge the pure strategy marginal 
cost price or randomize firms’ price offer on a strictly positive price range. If pure strategy equilibria 
arise post-merger then the horizontal aggregation has no real effect. If horizontal takeovers allow 
competing firms to play mixed strategies in the post-merger oligopoly, firms quote a higher price 
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than the competitive one raising profits for both the merged firm and any symmetric outsider, from 
the null pre-merger ones.  
5.3. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in Symmetric Oligopoly: Premerger 
Positive Price Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
Assume the individual capacity of the pre-merger firms allow a pure strategies equilibrium, i.e. 
   ̂ . Pre-merger equilibrium price is      and each symmetric firm earns   
*          for   
{     }. A horizontal merger among  firms affect equilibrium strategies post merger, as it might 
either leave firms play pure strategies or create a larger market player whose size allows to quote a 
higher price on the market than the competitive one, i.e. the equilibrium would be in mixed 
strategies. The merged firm is hereby indexed as firm A and the generic symmetric small-sized 
player is indexed B. In order to derive post merger equilibrium capacity threshold for the existence of 
pure strategy equilibrium we recall inequality (5.1) as follows  
     
 [     ]
    
  ̂  if              (5.3) 
and reconsider pure strategy equilibrium requirements at the light of the post merger capacity 
changes. Merger creates a larger firm, whose size is a proper multiple of the individual capacity of 
the merging firms, i.e.  A    . Merger alters residual demand and modifies outsider competitors’ 
capacities from        to       . Respectively,        indicates aggregate competitors’ 
capacity that each individual firm faces pre-merger and        the outsider’s capacity post-
merger. Hence, threshold for a pure strategy equilibrium changes accordingly. Inequality (5.3) 
identifies the region in which a mixed strategy equilibrium exists if       . The capacity 
threshold above which firms are allowed to randomize over their price offers is not explicitly 
defined; as   appears on the left hand side as well as the right hand side of inequality (5.5). In the 
following proposition we formalize the result for the post-merger capacity threshold  ̂   as follows 
Proposition 5.3 There exist a unique value of capacity  ̂   such that a pure strategy 
equilibrium exists if    ̂  , that holds if    ̂  ⁄ . 
Proof: We shall recall the Cournot-Nash best response function, take the first-order conditions and 
rearranging similarly to what has been done in section  5.2. We obtain the relation between    
     and industry capacity      ∑           differentiating both sides in total capacity. 
Differentiation and concavity of demand function assumptions yield      ⁄    
 (   
∑       )[ 
 (   ∑       )   (   ∑       ) 
  (   ∑       )]   . The shape of the relation is 
not yet defined as it depends upon the shape of demand function. Thus, the capacity threshold  ̃   is 
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the value that identifies in the      -space the intersection between the negatively sloped function 
 ̂      and the positively sloped ray through the origin     ⁄  . The intersection exists since 
the slope of  ̂     is finite and ranging between       . In terms of total capacity  ̂   is obtained as 
 ̂      ⁄    ̂    . Post-merger threshold must be lower than pre-merger capacity threshold 
 ̂     ̂ . Thus, a pure strategy post-merger equilibrium is played if    ̂  ⁄ .     Q.E.D.  
If inequality    ̂  ⁄  holds, the equilibrium postmerger will be played in pure strategies and firms 
will charge the aggregate capacity-exhausting equilibrium price      . Post-merger profits for the 
merged firm are -times the individual constituents’ profits pre merger   
*, i.e.   
*          
   
*. Joint profits are unchanged pre- and post merger, as well as outsider’s profits. Though clearly 
profitable for the merged firm, the takeover does not alter profits of all competitors. Thus, horizontal 
mergers in pure strategy equilibria do not have real effects on either firms or consumers. 
If individual post-merger capacity     ̂  ⁄   ̂ ], then horizontal mergers lead to a mixed strategy 
equilibrium. Similarly to the three-firm market, oligopolists will mix their price offers in the interval 
       , a subset of either the price interval (       (      )). The supremum of the post 
merger price range is determined by the largest firm, monopolizing residual demand as the smallest 
firm charges a lower price, i.e.    argmax   [           ]. Largest firm will earn profits 
  
                   . The infimum is set by the larger firm earning profits   
 . Then, 
   max { ̅  ̿}, where we define  ̅    
  ⁄  and  ̿ as the lower solution of equation   
       . 
In turn,     ̅ if          or     ̿, otherwise. It is straightforward to show that the merger is 
profitable for the outsider firm if post-merger equilibrium mixed strategies are played. Pre-merger 
individual firm earns pure strategy equilibrium profits   
*        , whilst post-merger outsider 
profits result   
*     . Since         , for a mixed strategy equilibrium to be played, then 
outsider firm earns higher profits post merger. Profitability analysis of horizontal mergers for the 
merged firm is less straightforward as it depends on its size vis-à-vis market demand at   . If 
                   , then equilibrium post merger profits read   
      . Comparing post 
and pre merger profits             , the merger is profitable for the merged firm. On the 
contrary, if                    , then merged firm’s profits are  A
*         , since 
    A
*      ⁄ . Thus, horizontal merger need further investigation and the consequences are non 
obvious. 
Proposition 5. 4 If  ̂     ̂  ⁄ , post-merger equilibrium is in mixed strategies where the 
range of equilibrium prices is strictly higher than the premerger price. Thus, the merger is profitable 
for the merging parties. 
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Proof: For the above reasoning, to show horizontal mergers profitability for insiders, it suffices to 
investigate the case in which         . Since            , if                , 
considered                , then                , then the merger is profitable. 
Merged firm’s expected profits are also equal to                 . Optimal choice    for 
merged firm yields first order conditions                 
       , that is       
   
              . The expression     
       is the first derivative of the concave 
function       in  , that is increasing only to the left of its maximum, i.e.     . This implies in 
turn,         and         .        Q.E.D. 
This symmetric oligopoly model produces the same results as the triopoly one, whose findings can be 
extended straightforwardly. If mixed equilibria prevail post merger, equilibrium profits are higher for 
both merging firms and outsiders. Horizontal mergers lead to price increase since the infimum of the 
mixed strategies support is higher than the pre-merger pure strategy equilibrium.   
5.4. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in Symmetric Oligopoly: Premerger Mixed 
Strategy Equilibrium 
Firms play mixed strategy equilibrium profiles, if    ̂ . To a mixed strategy equilibrium pre 
merger necessarily follows a mixed strategy equilibrium post merger, since    ̂   ̂  ⁄ . We can 
simply consider the effect of the change in the rivals’ total capacity to observe post-merger changes.  
In the standard symmetric model outsiders’ capacity is only       , reduced to        post 
merger, since              , so that residual demand is higher. Outsiders’ capacity affect 
price negatively, reducing residual demand.  The supremum of mixed strategies support increases as 
residual demand decreases, i.e. outsiders’ aggregate capacity is lower, as 
   
 ∑   
 
 
        
  . 
Intuitively, reduced outsiders’ capacity exerts a weaker competitive externality on the merged firm. 
We shall see how it affects equilibrium conditions in the remainder of the section. Post-merger 
equilibrium in mixed strategies resembles the one already seen. Supremum of mixed strategy 
equilibria is defined    argmax                , infimum      
   ⁄ . 
Proposition 5.5 If    ̂   ̂  ⁄ , the extrema of the mixed strategies support are greater 
than their respective pre-merger values and the merger is profitable for all firms. 
Proof: Following the reasoning of inequality (5.6) we can conclude      . Since capacities are 
defined as we have seen,         . Thus,                                . That 
leads to,                                  , and finally             
                       . The merged firm profits are greater than those of the joint 
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profits of the m pre-merger symmetric firms. This implies,          , or equivalently      . 
That is to say outsiders earn higher equilibrium profits, charging a higher post-merger price. Q.E.D. 
Similarly to section 4.3 equilibrium strategies depend on the position of  (      ) with respect to 
the post-merger extrema    and   . The dimensional characteristics of the post-merger mixed 
strategy region conditional upon the merged firm’s dimension with respect to the remainder of the 
industry can be written either  
I.                    if    ⁄  or 
II.                   , otherwise. 
Accordingly, we are allowed to write the following partitioning in capacity configuration (I)  
a.     (      )            (      ); 
b.  (      )               (      ); 
c.  (      )               (      ) 
d.  (      )               (      ); 
e.     (      )            (      ); 
f.        (      )         (      ). 
And finally, we are allowed to write the following partitioning in capacity configuration (II) 
a.     (      )      (      )       ; 
b.  (      )         (      )       ; 
c.        (      )   (      )       . 
For the characteristics of the dimension of the merged firm, if inequalities (I.b) or (I.c) hold, and the 
one in (II.b), the profile of equilibrium mixed strategies follows those of section 5.2. In the following 
proposition, the logic is the same as the one underlying Proposition 4.8 and the results (though 
partial) are the same. Post-merger price is higher than pre-merger and the probability for any firm to 
undercut any price level   is lower post-merger than the pre-merger. 
Proposition 5.6 If    ̂   ̂  ⁄ , post-merger mixed strategies (           ) have strict 
first-order stochastic dominance over pre-merger mixed strategy  , i.e. pre-merger firms have strictly 
higher probability to sell below any price   than any of the post merger firms (except at   ). 
Proof (Sketch): To show first-order stochastic dominance we shall consider those price ranges in 
which the price distributions overlap. The reasoning follows the proof of Proposition 4.1. Following 
the generalization of the Kreps e Scheinkman’s (1983) finding for duopoly, outsider firm is smaller 
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than the merged firm then      . Thus, it is sufficient to confront post-merger price distribution 
of the smaller (symmetric) firms with the pre-merger one. First, consider     (      ) and if 
 (      )     it implies       and there is no overlap in the configurations (I.b), (I,c), (I,d ) 
and (II.b). For the missing capacity configurations we analyze the reperesentative and sufficiently 
explicative case in which capacity falls in (I.f).  Similar conclusions hold for the other specifications. 
In (I.f) there is no overlap if         , otherwise          the post-merger profile of the 
mixed strategies follow from section 5.2. Whenever this reasoning holds the same characterizes the 
can be written       
 
 
*
        
         
+
 
   
 and       *
        
         
+
 
   
. Recall the pre-merger 
distribution for the symmetric player in the symmetric equilibrium      [
       
 (      )
]
 
   
    
{     }          . Since       ,       and in order for      it must be      . 
For the price range         in the relevant capacity configuration stochastic dominance can be 
shown comparing the slopes 
   
  
 and 
  
  
 of the distributions. The premerger distribution slope can be 
written  
  
  
 
 
   
*
       
         
+
 
   
     (      )        (             )
           
. The postmerger distribution 
slope 
   
  
 
 
   
*
        
         
+
 
   
     (      )        (             )
           
. In order to show post-merger 
stochastic dominance it must be 
   
  
 
  
  
.
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 This is true component by component for the two 
expressions above: the first term 
 
   
 
 
   
 since    ⁄ . Analogously, the roots 
 
   
 
 
   
. We 
can rewrite the radical as 
       
 (      )
 
        
 (      )
, then it should be             . From our 
assumptions it is true               , therefore 
        
 (      )
 
         
 (      )
 that implies    
           . The difference                  depends negatively on   . If price 
decreases from the upper bound the inequality                is confirmed for any price in 
       . In the relevant price range the postmerger distribution is steeper than the pre-merger one. 
Thus, the equilibrium pair (           ) stochastically dominate the pre-merger  . Q.E.D. 
The general symmetric oligopoly setting confirms the symmetric triopoly model findings: mixed 
strategies relax competitive constraints and allow quoting a higher price on the market than any pure 
strategy equilibrium. Any horizontal merger that allows oligopolists to play mixed strategies is 
profitable for the merging parties and outsiders. Horizontal merger lead to a price increase 
postmerger and if oligopolists play pre-merger mixed strategies then post-merger competition softens 
                                                          
51 If this is true then the two distributions do not cross since            . 
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as postmerger distributions assign a lower probability to undercut a certain price level than pre-
merger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The Nature of Postmerger Equilibrium as a Function of Individual Capacity in the Symmetric 
Oligopoly Model 
5.5. Horizontal Mergers Analysis in a Linear Demand Function Symmetric 
Oligopoly 
The linear demand model is the Davidson and Deneckere (1984)  -firm oligopoly whose market 
demand function is linear           if        ⁄  , zero otherwise. Although conceived for 
different purposes rather than private profitability analysis of static mergers, the model gives fair 
understanding of merger incentives in a price setting oligopoly. Studying pro collusive effects, 
Davidson and Deneckere (1984) find merger profitable for insiders, though they do not show it.
52
 We 
study Davidson and Deneckere’s contribution in a different framework, i.e. assuming the unilateral 
effects approach rather than the coordinated effects one. Thus, we can show horizontal mergers are 
always profitable for both outsiders and insiders. Moreover, increased market concentration allows 
for a higher market power gained by the merged firm that translates into higher price level to 
consumer detriment. We shall only consider the pre and post merger mixed strategy equilibria as the 
analysis produces the most interesting results. Pre-merger symmetric equilibrium characteristics 
follow the specifications in Vives (1986) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b). Pre-merger 
                                                          
52 Several results are enlisted but not shown in the reference paper, see Davidson and Deneckere (1984, p. 124). 
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merged firm’s dimension with respect to the remainder of the industry 
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symmetric firms earn equilibrium profits   
  [        ]   ⁄     {     }. The infimum 
and supremum of equilibrium mixed strategies supports are defined 
     
  ⁄  [        ]    ⁄  and    [        ]   ⁄ , respectively. The equilibrium 
mixed strategy pre-merger is       [
       
 (      )
]
 
   
    {     }. The investigated merger would 
take place among  symmetric firms, creating a larger firm whose size is a proper multiple of insider 
firms,      . Outsiders are left with their existing capacity  . Merged firm will be indexed firm A 
and the generic symmetric outsider will be indexed firm B. Post-merger equilibrium values of profits 
and supports’ extrema change according to the dimension of the merged firm: whether it is 
sufficiently big to satisfy all upcoming demand at the infimum of the support of the mixed strategies, 
or not. If         , that is         , then merged firm’s profits read 
  
  [        ]   ⁄ , outsider firms’ profits read   
  0  √      1
*1    ⁄ . Extrema of 
the mixed strategies support read    0  √      1
*1   ⁄  and    [        ]   ⁄ . If 
        , that is         , then, merged firm’s profits read   
  [        ]   ⁄ , 
outsider firms’ profits read   
  [        ]    ⁄ . Extrema of the mixed strategies support 
read    [        ]
     ⁄  and    argmax                 
[        ]   ⁄ . 
Horizontal mergers are profitable for merged firms, and it is straightforward to see that it is 
increasingly so in the number of participants. Horizontal merger will be profitable if merged firm’s 
profits are greater than the sum of the merger partners’ individual pre-merger profits. i.e. 
[        ]   ⁄    [        ]   ⁄ . Thus, [        ]    [        ]  and 
carrying out the square it becomes,           [            ]  [       
       ]    . The necessary manipulations lead to                   
               . Dividing by        , since    , reverses the inequality to 
                  . Inequality solves for     √  ⁄        √  ⁄  which is 
always true in the mixed strategy region, i.e.       ⁄      √  ⁄        √  ⁄  
      ⁄ . It is immediate to derive price effects that a merger has in the mixed strategy region. 
Horizontal mergers raise prices since both equilibrium mixed strategies supports extrema are higher 
post merger than pre merger. As market concentration increases, the support of equilibrium mixed 
strategies shrinks and moves up and rightwards, as the merged firm concentrates more and more 
mass at the upper endpoint of its support. If         , then the above inequality translating the 
profitability conditions of mergers, can be replicated for the lower bound of the mixed strategies 
supports, if [        ]    [        ]  then      . If           the same 
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conclusions hold. For the upper bound of equilibrium mixed strategies support it must be    
[        ]   ⁄  [        ]   ⁄     that is true for any   . 
What is left to show is profitability of mergers for the outsider firms. The horizontal merger leads to 
a more concentrated market whose players charge a higher price. Though, contrarily to Salant et al. 
(1983) result, non merged firms no longer gain more from the merger than merging partners. 
Analytically, the same inequality must hold for the insiders as well as for the outsiders. In order to 
derive the effect of horizontal mergers on price level we shall consider post-merger mixed strategies 
profiles. We shall just recall De Francesco and Salvadori’s (2010b) full characterization of 
equilibrium mixed strategies (           ). Substituting for the linear demand function parameters 
we can obtain the example-specific mixed strategies, and allow for the comparison between pre and 
post merger distributions. Mixed strategy profiles are the ones in Theorem 3.1 obtained in Davidson 
and Deneckere (1984) and described in chapter 3. Moreover, De Francesco and Salvadori (2010b), 
despite the rise of multiple equilibria (sometimes a continuum), show that equilibrium profits are 
unique regardless the non-uniqueness of equilibrium mixed strategies.  
The linear demand function model confirms the general oligopoly model results. Horizontal merging 
among  of the   competitors relaxes the terms of competition by allowing competitors to charge a 
higher price than pre-merger. Moreover, the probability for the post-merger firms to quote a lower 
price than any price   is lower post-merger than pre-merger. 
5.6. Concluding Remarks on Horizontal Mergers in Symmetric Oligopolies 
The symmetric oligopoly model extends the findings of the basic triopoly model considering the 
various capacity configurations that arise in an  -firm model. If firms are capacity-unconstrained and 
their dimension allow them to satisfy all forthcoming demand at marginal cost then the model 
reproduces the standard Bertrand result. Firms play a pure strategy equilibrium quoting marginal cost 
as equilibrium price and earn zero profits. Horizontal mergers do not alter the equilibrium and post-
merger equilibrium characteristics are the same as pre-merger. The standard Bertrand result can also 
be replicated in oligopoly if all but the largest oligopolist can satisfy upcoming demand at marginal 
cost, i.e.            . In this model the largest oligopolist is any equally-sized rival firm pre-
merger, and becomes the merged firm as soon as the takeover takes place. 
If horizontal mergers create a firm whose size allows respecting the inequality            ⁄  
         ⁄ , presumably if the merger is sufficiently small, then horizontal merging does not 
change equilibrium features and null price pure strategy equilibrium represents the unique 
equilibrium. On the contrary, if the merger creates a market participant whose size is such that the 
inequality          ⁄             ⁄  holds, then the coalition and the outsiders play a 
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mixed strategy whose bounds are strictly positive. Thus, merging allows firms to play a strictly 
greater price than the pre-merger and earn positive profits. Horizontal merger is profitable for both 
the survival firm and the outsiders. An important distinction between the basic triopoly model and the 
oligopoly one is the profile of the mixed strategies post-merger. In triopoly a merger that turns the 
pure strategy equilibrium à la Bertrand into a mixed strategy equilibrium necessarily creates a firm 
whose size allows to satisfy all upcoming demand at the infimum of the mixed strategy support. 
On the other hand, if firms capacity constraints are binding the premerger equilibrium is in pure 
strategies and firms charge the price that markets total production and earn competitive profits on 
their capacities. If horizontal mergers create a firm whose size is below its Cournot best-response 
quantity, then equilibrium will be in pure strategies (positive competitive price) with the same 
characteristics both pre and post merger. As we have seen, if firm’s capacity is such that   
  ̂  ⁄   ̂ ], then horizontal mergers lead to a mixed strategy equilibrium. If firms play a mixed 
strategy then horizontal mergers increase industry profitability as well as firms’ profitability. Both 
merged firm and outsiders gain from horizontal merging and increase their profits from the 
competitive ones. 
If  ̂     ̂  ⁄ , postmerger equilibrium is in mixed strategies and merged firm increases its 
profits over its premerger joint profit level. Postmerger mixed strategy supports shift rightwards since 
both extrema increase. The reduction in competitors’ number allows merged firm to monopolize a 
higher residual demand and increase profits over the premerger value of its constituent firms. This in 
turn allows firms randomizing on a higher price range, and undercut a certain price level with lower 
probability than premerger. Horizontal mergers relax competitive constraints leading to unilateral 
price increase by both the coalition and the outsiders if mixed strategies are played postmerger. 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown that horizontal mergers among equally-sized competitors in Bertrand-Edgeworth 
games are always non-detrimental for merging parties. Contrary to symmetric treatment in Cournot 
competition, in which a multiplant Cournot competitor forms post-merger (with the same dimension 
of the competitors prior to the merger), this essay tackles horizontal mergers as exogenous market 
structure changes that create a new firm (survival firm) whose size is a proper multiple of the 
merging firms’ capacity. Horizontal combinations of price-setters in a homogenous product market, 
under efficient rationing, are studied first in a symmetric triopoly and then in a symmetric oligopoly. 
Oligopolists’ strategic profiles hinge on their dimensional characteristics. Equilibrium prior to the 
merger arises either in pure or mixed strategies. If firms’ capacity is unlimited then a pure strategy 
equilibrium exists and each firm is capable of supplying all forthcoming demand at marginal cost. 
Thus, price drives down to marginal cost and firms earn zero profits. In  -firm oligopolies the same 
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is true if the aggregate capacity but the largest one is enough to supply market demand at marginal 
cost. On the other hand, if firms supply (at most) their Cournot best-response function then a pure 
strategy equilibrium exists, as well. With limited capacities, firms exhaust their productive 
capabilities and charge the price that allows selling the aggregate capacity on the market, earning 
competitive profits. If capacities are indetermediate, then equilibrium arises in mixed strategies. 
Mixed equilibria are characterized by firms randomizing over a price range, whose lower bound is 
strictly greater than the price that markets the aggregate production.  
Firms’ takeovers then characterize equilibrium features. If firms are either large or small enough, the 
survival firm represents either a sufficiently large or small competitor, whose size does not alter 
equilibrium strategy profile. That is, if the merger creates a firm that is sufficiently large to 
accommodate forthcoming demand at marginal cost then equilibrium post-merger will rest à la 
Bertrand. Both the merged firm and the outsiders will charge marginal cost pricing and earn zero 
profits. Thus, post-merger equilibrium is the same as pre-merger and horizontal takeovers do not 
affect price, profits, consumer surplus and total welfare. Similarly, if the merger creates a firm that is 
sufficiently small, that is merged firm’s capacity is no greater than its Cournot best-response, then 
equilibrium will arise in pure strategies with the same characteristics as pre-merger. Firms have no 
incentive to charge either a higher or a lower price than the pre-merger equilibrium one. Pure strategy 
equilibria post-merger do not alter market equilibrium characteristics and exert no real effect on the 
market. 
If the merged firm gains enough capacity after the merger, then different pricing incentive arise 
between the merged firm and the symmetric outsiders. That is, post-merger capacity constraints 
might not be necessarily binding, unlike pure strategy equilibria à la Cournot in which capacities 
represent a quantity commitment for firms. In mixed strategies firm randomize their price offers, 
exhausting full capacity only with some positive probability. If mixed strategy equilibria arise post-
merger all market firms have an incentive to raise price (and profits) with respect to the pre-merger 
equilibrium. Horizontal merges are then benefiting both insiders and outsiders preventing outsiders 
from free-riding the merged firm’s output restriction (by increasing their sales). In particular, if firms 
play mixed strategies pre-merger then post-merger equilibrium (necessarily mixed) witness an 
increase in price due to higher mixed strategy supports’ extrema than the ones before the merger. 
Reducing the number of competitors increases residual demand and shifts up and rightwards both the 
infimum and supremum of equilibrium mixed strategies support. Horizontal merging effect, relaxing 
competitive externality among oligopolists is clearer in this case: post-merger price distributions are 
(first-order) stochastically dominated by the pre-merger ones. That is, post-merger firms’ probability 
to charge a lower price than any given price level is inferior than the one prior to the merger. 
Consequently, profitability for both insiders and outsiders increase. 
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